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FOREWORD  
 
This Major Research Paper (MRP) identifies and discusses challenges and 
opportunities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement through the perspective of 
developing countries, with a focus on the Africa Group. Work began with an intent to 
explore the barriers to the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC) under the Paris Agreement from the perspective of African countries with a 
strong focus on the role of transparency. This led to the formulation of the Plan of 
Study (POS). As this work took shape, it became clear that under the current 
architecture of the Paris Agreement, which incorporates provisions for both mitigation 
and adaptation, it leaves open questions on adaptation and how adaptation will be 
balanced with mitigation. Given the importance of adaptation to developing countries, 
and particularly the negotiating bloc of the Africa Group at the UNFCCC, the work 
evolved with a greater focus on understanding the concerns for adaptation in the NDC 
implementation. While this MRP has evolved since the POS, it remains within the 
contours of the implementation of the NDCs under the Paris Agreement’s 
international climate governance architecture. 
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ABSTRACT  
 
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 is the result of several years of 
rigorous efforts and negotiations towards an ambitious and inclusive climate 
governance structure under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The entry into force of the Paris Agreement has presented a new 
beginning for climate governance, opening up a pathway for intensive work towards 
the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The structure of 
the Paris Agreement provides Parties some flexibility based on their national 
circumstances, to ensure that all Parties actively contribute to the climate effort. 
Along with provisions of flexibility, the Paris Agreement introduces reporting 
structures so that NDCs are to be scrutinized and justified in regular intervals through 
a process known as the Global Stocktake. The structure of the NDCs and architecture 
of the Paris Agreement places the effectiveness of climate policy in the hands of all 
Parties.  
 
Of concern to developing countries and particularly the Africa Group, is how 
adaptation can be balanced with mitigation in the implementation of NDCs. 
Achieving such a balance is important for the Africa Group as adaptation is linked to 
national development priorities. This Major Research Paper (MRP) attempts to make 
progress on the work necessary to balance adaptation with mitigation in the 
implementation of NDCs. The MRP explores the Means of Implementation (MOI) 
under the architecture of the Paris Agreement with a strong focus on adaptation, 
through the perspective of the Africa Group and applies these findings to a case study 
on the Kingdom of Swaziland. The MRP explores the role of MOIs, including its 
opportunities and barriers in supporting a balance between adaptation and mitigation, 
in the hopes that developing countries will no longer have to prioritize adaptation over 
mitigation. 
 
Following an in-depth exploration of the MOIs, the MRP explores the potential of 
adaptation reporting for alleviating some of the identified barriers and for progressing 
towards a balanced NDC implementation pathway. The MRP concludes by 
identifying the opportune moment for the Africa Group in leading Parties towards a 
more balanced NDC implementation pathway. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
I now invite the COP to adopt the draft decision entitled “Paris Agreement” which 
features in the document. I’m looking at the hall, I can see the reaction is positive and 
I hear no objection. The Paris Agreement for the climate is accepted. 
Statement by, H.E. Mr. Laurent Fabius, COP 21/CMP 11 President, Le Bourget, 12 
December 2015. 
 
The Paris Agreement adopted in December 2015 is the result of several years of 
rigorous efforts and negotiations towards an ambitious and inclusive climate 
governance structure. The adoption of the Paris Agreement has presented a new 
beginning for climate governance, opening up a pathway for intensive work towards 
the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). NDCs are 
pledges put forth by individual countries based on their national development 
priorities and circumstances. NDCs indicate Parties’ intended climate actions and 
contributions to the global climate effort. The structure of the Paris Agreement 
provides Parties some flexibility based on their national circumstances, to ensure that 
all Parties actively contribute to this effort. Along with flexibility, the Paris 
Agreement introduces reporting structures so that NDC pledges are to be justified in 
regular intervals through a process known as Global Stocktakes. The structure of the 
NDCs and architecture of the Paris Agreement places climate policy in the hands of 
all Parties.  
 With the first Global Stocktake due for 2018, the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Paris Agreement (APA) is actively working on developing the procedures and 
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modalities for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. One of the questions raised 
during this process is how to balance adaptation with mitigation. This question 
problematizes the place of adaptation and an appropriate pathway for its 
implementation in the NDCs. Clarity over an adaptation pathway is an important 
priority for developing countries, particularly the Africa Group. The questions that 
arise with implementing adaptation and mitigation are not new, and they have shaped 
the negotiations prior to COP21. However, the entry into force of the Paris Agreement 
has required that all Parties consider the questions on adaptation in a more concrete 
way, as they will shape the implementation of the Paris Agreement.  
 This Major Research Paper (MRP) is broadly concerned with the question of 
how to balance adaptation with mitigation in the NDC implementation. It engages this 
question within a governance framework tied to the architecture of the Paris 
Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). One cannot provide a clear answer to this question unless there is an 
understanding of the concerns and priorities of Parties. This MRP thus looks at this 
question through the perspective of developing countries, specifically the Africa 
Group. The Africa Group identifies specific vulnerabilities to climate change and 
emphatically calls for adaptation support in the implementation of the NDCs as 
support for adaptation has historically lagged behind mitigation.  
 Although mitigation is important, the heart of this MRP consists of identifying 
the barriers faced by the Africa Group for NDC implementation with a special focus 
on adaptation. This is because an understanding of the barriers to NDC 
implementation is pivotal to develop a pathway for adaptation required by the Africa 
Group in order to move forward on a strong footing. This groundwork may provide a 
clear understanding of the terrains on which adaptation is working in and the aim is 
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that these findings may inform future work towards an adaptation pathway that is 
sensitive to the experiences and needs of the Africa Group.  
 In doing this work, I have engaged in a textual and interpretive analysis within 
the framework of the Paris Agreement. The MRP draws on: 1) recent interdisciplinary 
and policy literature following the Paris Agreement; 2) submissions and reporting 
documents such as National Communications submitted by Parties to the UNFCCC; 
3) UNFCCC official documents and my experience as an observer and member of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland’s Delegation to the UNFCCCs African Group of Negotiators.  
 This MRP consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a historical account of 
international climate change governance to better understand the processes and 
outcomes that have shaped the architecture of the Paris Agreement. This chapter 
introduces the NDCs and elaborates on the relationship between NDCs and 
sustainable development.  
 Chapter 2 sheds light on the long-standing discussion over the balancing of 
adaptation with mitigation from the perspective of the Africa Group. This section sets 
the foundation to better understand why a clear roadmap for an adaptation pathway 
moving forward is important to developing countries. With a special consideration on 
the Africa Group, this chapter then identifies the means of implementation under the 
Paris Agreement to facilitate NDC implementation with a close look at climate 
finance, technology transfer, capacity building and the Enhanced Transparency 
Framework.  
 Chapter 3 conducts an examination of these NDC implementation barriers as 
they arise on the national level in the Sub-Saharan African Kingdom of Swaziland. 
This chapter identifies a lack of political buy in, access to technology, capacity 
building, and finance as core barriers to NDC implementation.  
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 Chapter 4 reflects in light of what has been learned through chapters 2 and 3 
on the question of balancing adaptation with mitigation in the implementation of the 
NDCs. The discussion makes the case that while developing countries have apparent 
barriers that must be overcome for the implementation of their NDCs, overcoming 
these barriers must be a priority. In doing so, there is an opportunity presented to 
Parties by engaging proactively in the adaptation communications for empowerment 
and for making progress towards sustainable development.  
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CHAPTER 1   Preliminaries: The Institutional Context 
 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been 
recognized for its role in restoring confidence in the climate change governance 
regime by establishing long-term governance architecture. The chapter begins with a 
general overview on the historical trajectory of the climate change governance 
structure from its inception to present. The chapter will then focus on the climate 
governance architecture from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement highlighting 
the transition away from a binding, prescriptive and punitive regime to one that is 
more flexible and non- punitive. The chapter will introduce the Nationally 
Determined Contributions, which are at the center of this MRP and will make the link 
between the importance of NDCs and sustainable development. 
 
I. International Climate Change Governance Regime 
 
I.  1. General Overview 
Roughly thirty years ago, the international community recognized the looming threat 
of climate change to the health and integrity of the environment and the livelihoods of 
people around the world. Uncertainty over the extent of the threat of climate change 
gained widespread support for the creation of a regime under which climate change 
would be governed. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), hereby ‘Convention’ was created with this mandate. Since its entry into 
force in 1994, the UNFCCC has evolved significantly. At its inception, the UNFCCC 
governance structure was relatively vague, and did not require Parties to commit to 
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any specific quantifiable emission targets. Instead, the Convention identified basic 
principles and objectives to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Little direction 
was provided by the Convention on how its objectives would be achieved or 
measured. Over time, formal negotiations created the various bodies of the 
Convention along with subsequent mandates. As a result, the Convention is now 
supported by mandated institutions that have made the operationalization of the 
UNFCCC more efficient. 
By 2005, the architecture of international climate change governance had 
evolved significantly since its inception through to the entry into force of the 
UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997), 
which primarily aimed to tackle GHG emissions, instilled a structure of static 
differentiation between Parties. This model of differentiation held developed 
countries accountable for stringent quantifiable GHG emission reduction targets.  
Over time, it became increasingly clear that this bifurcated model of 
responsibility for climate action would be difficult to be maintained for a range of 
reasons. The twists and turns of political dynamics in the multilateral negotiations 
compounded by the changing emissions trends had an impact on the dynamics of 
international cooperation. The varying responses to the structure of the Kyoto 
Protocol amongst developed countries signaled that developed countries did not carry 
a homogenous stance on all agenda items. This is evident as some developed 
countries including Parties of the European Union were in support of the Kyoto 
Protocol and its structure, while others such as the United States did not support the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (Barnsley, 2006). As countries including Canada 
subsequently withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol and later, Japan and Russia joined 
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Canada in affirming that they would not commit to the Protocol’s second commitment 
period, it was clear that a new climate governance structure would need to be 
considered.  
At the same time, it was becoming increasingly clear that similar to developed 
countries, developing countries were also not a homogenous bloc. Developing 
countries vary vastly in their levels of development and thus emission patterns. Some 
of the major developing countries were reaching the GHG emissions trends of 
developed countries, and yet were not listed under Annex I countries. This growing 
reality of developed countries becoming major emitters without having a burden of 
responsibility for GHG reductions, amplified by the tangles of international politics 
under the UNFCCC challenged international cooperation under the architecture of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Resultant of a multiplicity of reasons ranging from political issues to those 
over international cooperation, it was evident that if the climate effort was to move 
forward, the Kyoto model would have to transition towards a more inclusive and 
malleable governance model. Moving forward, subsequent negotiations under the 
UNFCCC process transitioned away from the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol and 
began to make progress towards a more inclusive and flexible, yet procedurally robust 
structure that would encourage Parties to collectively contribute to the climate effort.  
With this difficult task, Parties and stakeholders of the Convention engaged in 
years of intensive negotiations, up until the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21), 
where on December 12th, 2015 the COP adopted the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 
2015b, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1). The Paris Agreement sets a long-term architecture 
for the global climate effort and facilitates a flexible governance structure through a 
system of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The NDCs, which are Party 
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driven, hold great potential for the involvement of all Parties in the global climate 
effort. In what follows, I provide a historical overview to understand the stages that 
led up to the Paris Agreement.  
 
I .  2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
The call for a single, intergovernmental institution to govern climate change, which 
became the role of the UNFCCC, came into fruition as a result of various United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions. The UNFCCC was created in 
response to the alarming scientific findings on climate change reported by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC (IPCC, 1990). The IPCC, which 
was created in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), remains autonomous and is the 
primary scientific body that provides the most recent scientific information available 
to the UNFCCC.  
The UNGA, through UNEP and the WMO mandated the IPCC to conduct a 
comprehensive review on the issue of climate change, and to report on 
recommendations and potential response strategies to deal with climate change 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1988, A/RES/43/53). In accordance with this 
mandate, the IPCC released its first scientific and peer reviewed Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 1990) which identified with certainty that “emissions resulting from human 
activities are substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the 
greenhouse gases; carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous 
oxide” (IPCC, 1990, p. xi). The report also noted that increases in GHG would further 
the greenhouse effect, enhancing the warming of the earth’s surface.  
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In response to these findings, the UNGA recognized the importance of 
continuing scientific research to better understand the phenomenon of climate change 
and thus, mandated the creation of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee 
(INC). The INC began the negotiating process of the institution that later would 
become known as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(United Nations General Assembly, 1990, A/RES45/212). The then newly established 
INC documented its concerns over the deteriorating state of the environment at its 
second session (June, 1991).  
 
Deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration of the state of the 
environment and (…) trends that, if allowed to continue, could disrupt the 
global ecological balance, jeopardize the life-sustaining qualities of the Earth 
and lead to an ecological catastrophe, (…) decisive, urgent and global action is 
vital to protecting the ecological balance of the Earth (United Nations General 
Assembly, 1989, A/RES/44/228). 
 
 The concern of the INC over the integrity of the environment encouraged 
progress towards the creation of the UNFCCC and set the foundation for its adoption 
(A/AC.237/18 Part II, Add.1, 1992). In May 1992, the text of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted with a main objective of; 
 
(…) to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow 
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ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed 
in a sustainable manner (United Nations, 1992, Article 2). 
 
 With the objective of addressing climate change and stabilizing atmospheric 
GHG emissions, the Convention has been considered a historical landmark in 
international environmental management (Mintzer, Leonard, and Chadwick, 2000).  
 
I .  3. Bodies of the UNFCCC  
The UNFCCC hosts various subsidiary bodies, each with specific mandates to tackle 
the formidable challenge of climate change. The Conference of the Parties (COP) is 
one of these bodies and is the primary decision making body of the Convention. The 
COP aims to ensure an effective implementation of the Convention (UN, 1992, 
Article 7). Since the first conference of the Parties (COP1) of 1995, the COP 
generally convenes on an annual basis where the year 2017 will mark the twenty third 
time the Conference of the Parties will convene. 
Along with this primary decision-making body, the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI) are the two permanent scientific bodies that inform the COP. 
The SBSTA provides the COP with information and advice on scientific and 
technological matters relating to the Convention (UN, 1992, Article 9). The SBI is 
intended to assist the COP and its bodies with issues relating to the implementation of 
the Convention (UN, 1992, Article 10). Together, these bodies work with the 
Secretariat whose function is to assist the COP with various forms of support, 
including the compilation of reports, making information accessible to all Parties and 
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stakeholders, and facilitating the coordination of relevant bodies as required by the 
COP (UN, 1992, Article 8). 
While there has been appreciable progress achieved by the COP, its subsidiary 
bodies and the Secretariat, this progress has not come without challenges. In my view, 
one of the major political hindrances to the climate regime is the disproportionate 
allocation of responsibility for climate action between developed and developing 
countries; a determinant that has lingered since the inception of the Convention. This 
bifurcated model of responsibility to be explored in greater depth below has been a 
point of disagreement between Parties and has been a driving force behind the new 
architecture of climate governance as adopted in the Paris Agreement.  
 
I .  4. Bifurcation of Parties under the Convention  
Along with the objectives of the Convention, including that of stabilizing GHG 
concentrations, the Convention adopts Principles to guide its implementation. One of 
the more contentious Principles is noted in Article 3, the Principle of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities, and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC), which 
places a greater onus for climate action on industrialized countries. Specifically, the 
Convention notes that action should be taken to protect the climate system on “the 
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities” such that developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change (UN, 1992, Article 3(1)). In 
accordance with this static model of differentiation that continued through the Kyoto 
Protocol, Parties have been divided into three groups known as Annexes, namely; 
Annex I, Annex II and non-Annex I, reflecting the varying levels of commitment and 
capacity to take climate action.  
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Annex I comprises of members of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and countries with Economies in transition 
(EIT). This group is expected to take the lead in the global climate effort by “limiting 
its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs” through the implementation of national climate 
change policies to facilitate mitigation (UN, 1992, Article 4 (2)(a)). 
Annex II Parties include OECD member countries but not the EIT listed in 
Annex I. These Parties are required to provide “new and additional financial 
resources” to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation as well as technology 
transfer initiatives as agreed under the Convention (UN, 1992, Article 4 (3)).  
Non-Annex I Parties consist primarily of developing countries vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change. Amongst this group of Parties is the Least Developed 
Country Group (LDC) which is granted special consideration under the Convention 
based on a limited capacity to respond to climate change and adapt to its adverse 
effects (UN, 1992, Article 3). 
Together, these Annexes include all 197 Parties (196 States and 1 regional 
economic integration organization) who are Party to the UNFCCC, and sheds light on 
the expectations from the Convention to Parties in their Annexes. While there are 
officially three Annex groups in the context of the climate negotiations, Parties are 
generally discussed as between Annex I (developed countries) and non-Annex I 
(developing countries).   
The Annexes are largely divided over their views on CBDR-RC. On the one 
hand, non-Annex I Parties believe that the Principle of CBDR-RC should be 
maintained in the climate discussions and decisions as it appropriately allocates 
responsibility to states according to their historical GHG contributions (Brunnée and 
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Streck, 2013). Some Annex I Parties on the other hand, recommend a shift away from 
CBDR-RC towards a model of responsibility for climate action that is inclusive of all 
member states (Bodansky and Diringer, 2014; Brunnée and Streck, 2013). In order to 
have a better understanding of the differing views on CBDR-RC, the next section will 
explore the structure of the bifurcated model that presided over the negotiations 
during the era of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
II. From the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement  
 
II.  1. Structure of the Kyoto Protocol  
The third Conference of the Parties (COP3) in 1997, adopted the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC, 1997) which entered into force in 2005. The Kyoto Protocol was a 
binding agreement that imposed GHG emission reductions on Annex I Parties based 
on the principle of CBDR-RC (UNFCCC, 1997, Article 3). Central to the Kyoto 
Protocol was the bifurcated model, differentiating GHG emission reduction 
commitments between Parties. The static differentiation of Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol was a consequence of the wide disparity in capacity to engage in climate 
change adaptation and mitigation efforts (Savaresi, 2016). In attempt to balance 
climate efforts considering national capacities and CBDR-RC, the Kyoto Protocol 
allocated an unequal burden of responsibility for climate action to developed 
countries.  
The bifurcated model of responsibility became particularly problematic as 
developed countries were under careful scrutiny from the international community to 
decrease GHG emissions, while developing countries continued to accumulate 
financial resources for carbon intensive industrialization. As carbon intensive growth 
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continued to dominate and the Kyoto Protocol garnered a decreasing amount of 
support from Annex I Parties, there was growing concern that mitigation efforts from 
developed countries alone would not be enough to prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
climate change (Savaresi, 2016).  
At this point, it was clear that an updated and more inclusive architecture 
would be required for successful climate change governance. In the negotiations 
following the Kyoto Protocol, Parties engaged in discussions to find consensus on a 
way to encourage more Parties to join the global climate effort through GHG 
reductions (Savaresi, 2016). These negotiations were indeed difficult and suffered 
numerous setbacks, particularly at the height of disagreement at COP15 in 
Copenhagen where Parties were unable to reach consensus over the details of a 
governance architecture to replace the Kyoto Protocol.  
While COP15 is often criticized, the outcome of the discussions provided 
direction towards the new governance structure (Bodansky, 2010). As COP 15 shed 
light on the red lines of Parties and set the tone from Parties on their expectations 
from one another, COP15 influenced the structure of the new climate agreement, 
which is more inclusive and flexible in nature. Eventually, subsequent negotiations 
that built on the Copenhagen Conference facilitated the creation of a more agreeable 
governance structure that is reflected in the Paris Agreement. 
 
II.2. Structure of the Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement, which succeeded the Kyoto Protocol, is the most recent 
milestone of international climate change governance. 195 Parties reached consensus 
on the Paris Agreement, which was formally adopted in UNFCCC COP decision 
1/CP.21 on December 12, 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015b, FCCC/CP/2015/10, Add.1).  
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The Paris Agreement experienced an early entry into force on November 4 
2016, as 55 countries, accounting for a minimum of 55% of global GHG emissions, 
submitted their instrument of ratification to the UNFCCC before the anticipated entry 
into force date of 2020 (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 21). The early entry into force of 
the Paris Agreement signals widespread political will and support for collective 
climate action (Bodansky, 2016). The Paris Agreement embodies various unique 
features in its governance structure, which provides according to Bodansky, a firmer 
foundation on which to build than its predecessor, the more prescriptive Kyoto 
Protocol (Bodansky, 2016). There are four features of the Paris Agreement, which are 
particularly relevant to this investigation.  
First, the Paris Agreement sets a global average temperature goal, which aims 
to encourage Parties to limit GHG emissions. The Paris Agreement strives to limit 
global temperature rise to “well below 2 °C above preindustrial levels and pursuing 
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels” 
(UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 2(1)(a)). The Paris Agreement displays a transformation of 
international climate change governance where for the first time a UNFCCC 
architecture attempts to bridge the differing political interests and priorities that have 
stalled negotiations prior. The Paris Agreement facilitates this bridging process by 
promoting the participation of all Parties while tackling issues “balanc[ing] national 
flexibility and international discipline” (Bodansky and Diringer, 2014). In this new 
architecture, member states presented their climate commitments through Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), now known as Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) since the ratification of the Paris Agreement. The level of 
ambition of each NDC is essential as it holds the potential to influence the stability of 
the climate system.  
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Second, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement is a global agreement, 
applying to Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, with special provisions for the Least 
Developed Country Group (LDC). This is important because for the first time, the 
climate regime insists on the collective action of all states, encouraging Parties with 
historically varying financial capacities and development priorities to engage in the 
global climate effort.  
Third, although the Paris Agreement is recognized as a binding instrument, it 
contains many non-binding elements (Bodansky, 2016). Parties are held liable to, 
“prepare, communicate and maintain” (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 4(2)) their NDCs so 
that subsequent pledges will be more ambitious than the previous. However, Parties 
are not obliged to fulfill the pledges of their NDCs. This is one of the greatest 
weaknesses of this long-term governance structure. The fulfillment of NDCs is 
critical to limit adverse climate change impacts. 
Fourth, because of this non-binding element, the Paris Agreement involves an 
Enhanced Transparency Framework. The Enhanced Transparency Framework lends 
credence to the pivotal role of reporting. Reporting under the Enhanced Transparency 
Framework will document support provided and received by Parties and it intends to 
reflect the progress made by Parties towards their NDCs. While the Enhanced 
Transparency Framework will be essential to the overall success of the Paris 
Agreement, reporting will prove to be an obstacle faced by developing countries in 
the implementation of their NDCs as will be explored in chapter 2. 
 
Nationally Determined Contributions 
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), in accordance with Warsaw 
decision 1/CP.19 (paragraph 2 (b)) (UNFCCC, 2013, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1) is the 
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approach taken under the Paris Agreement towards achieving the objective of the 
Convention; to stabilize greenhouse gases (UN, 1992, Article 2).  
Prior to the convening of COP21, Parties submitted their INDCs to the 
UNFCCC Secretariat. Each INDC was meant to be in accordance with national 
circumstances, reflecting the highest possible level of ambition from individual 
Parties. Once each Party submits their formal instrument of ratification of the Paris 
Agreement, their INDC is converted to an NDC and uploaded by the Secretariat to the 
NDC Registry, accessible to all (see UNFCCC Newsroom, NDC Registry). Upon 
conversion, as per the provisions of the Agreement, progress made by member states 
towards their NDC is to be reported every five years to the UNFCCC Secretariat, 
through a Global Stocktake (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 14). In this process, there is an 
expectation that Parties will ‘ratchet-up’ their ambition so that each stocktake will be 
more ambitious than the last (Morgan, Dagnet, Höhne, Oberthü and Li, 2014).  
Bodansky and Diringer (2014) classify the new architecture of the Paris 
Agreement as a hybrid model, reflecting a combination of bottom-up features with 
some top-down procedures. Bottom-up in that NDCs have been submitted by nations 
in accordance with their individual priorities and capacities to meet the goals outlined 
in the Paris Agreement. And top-down, as was established in the Warsaw decision 
embedding a widespread reporting mechanism (UNFCCC, 2013, decision 14/CP.19). 
 
NDCs and Sustainable Development  
Under the Convention, Parties are encouraged to enhance their sustainable 
development Priorities. As each country is invited to submit their adaptation and 
mitigation climate actions through NDCs, Parties are given an opportunity for the first 
time to compose their commitments in line with their sustainable development 
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priorities and economic realities. In fulfilling country pledges that consist of both 
adaptation and mitigation priorities, it is especially important for developing countries 
to achieve a balance of support in the implementation of the NDCs between 
adaptation and mitigation. Essentially, the vision behind the NDC architecture is in 
line with the Convention’s support for sustainable development, “Parties have a right 
to, and should, promote sustainable development” (UN, 1992, Article 3(4)). 
The United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UN, 2015, 
A/RES/70/1) strives to tackle the root causes of poverty, inequality, poor 
infrastructure, climate change, consumption patters and other factors known to hinder 
sustainable development. The interconnectedness of climate change and sustainable 
development is evident as developing country governments are increasingly diverting 
national finances initially budgeted for sustainable development to coping with the 
losses and damages associated with the impacts of climate change. Not only does this 
prevent countries from enhancing their adaptive capacities and resilience to climate 
change (Holdaway and Dodwell, 2015), but it also hinders progress made towards the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Ladan (2016) describes the 
interconnectedness of climate change and sustainable development as “two mutually 
reinforcing sides of the same coin” (p.38). This is because sustainable development, 
particularly in developing countries cannot be achieved without ambitious climate 
action, and ambitious climate action cannot be achieved if development is not 
sustainable. There is extensive literature identifying the threat that climate change 
poses to sustainable development and poverty alleviation. While a full overview of 
this interconnectedness is not within the purview of this MRP, it is worth underlining 
the opportune moment presented by the Paris Agreement’s NDC structure to 
incorporate sustainable development priorities to climate change action plans.  
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In conjunction with bridging sustainable development priorities and climate 
action plans, the NDC structure aims to put the world on track towards a low carbon, 
climate resilient development pathway (Holdaway and Dodwell, 2015).  
On an aggregate level, the INDCs submitted by Parties in the lead up to 
COP21, showed that commitments were not sufficient to meet the temperature goal of 
the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015c, FCCC/CP/2015/7; Gütschow et al., 2015). 
Moreover, one third of all INDC submissions before COP21 included only 
conditional commitments; commitments that will only be fulfilled with specific 
access to support (Day, Röser, and Kurdziel, 2016). The Secretariat’s Synthesis 
Report (UNFCCC, 2015c) shows that even if all contributions were to be 
implemented by Parties, including the conditional commitments, the world would be 
on track for a 2.7 °C warming by the year 2100. Although this is higher than the “well 
below 2 °C” temperature goal, the Synthesis Report emphasizes the importance of 
INDCs because without them, current emission trends would put the world on track 
for 3.6 °C warming by 2100 (UNFCCC, 2015c). Although current contributions are 
not ambitious enough to meet the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement, they have 
the potential to limit warming in comparison to warming anticipated under scenarios 
of business as usual. As a result, fulfilling country commitments as pledged in the 
NDCs is critical for preventing catastrophic climate change.  
This brief historical overview has shown a shift in climate change governance, 
away from a strict burden allocation and towards a more durable and inclusive 
framework based on NDCs. The next chapter will focus on the main areas of concern 
in the process of building the modalities for the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement, with a focus on adaptation from the perspective of the Africa Group. 
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CHAPTER 2   The Importance and Challenges of Adaptation for Africa 
 
 
As countries made most vulnerable to climate change continue to suffer a 
disproportionate burden of climate impacts, considerable climate efforts of 
developing countries have had to focus on adaptation in order to enhance the adaptive 
capacity of communities living on the front lines. The architecture of the Paris 
Agreement allows Parties to put forth their climate actions in a way that is responsive 
to their national capacities (Bodansky, 2016; Obergassel et al., 2016; Hermwille, 
Obergassel, Ott, & Beuermann, 2015; Bodansky & Diringer, 2014). As developing 
countries aim to ensure adequate adaptation provisions, tensions arise around 
managing adaptation and mitigation in the implementation of NDCs. Important to this 
chapter is that the historical prioritization of mitigation over adaptation under the 
UNFCCC has created a gap in available support for the adaptation needs of 
developing countries. This chapter notes this adaptation gap and recognizes that in 
attempting to balance adaptation with mitigation, developing countries will likely 
have to channel their limited resources towards adaptation. This chapter begins by 
outlining the adaptation versus mitigation positions, informing the rationale for each 
position. The chapter then explores the means of implementation (MOI) in the 
architecture of the Paris Agreement with a focus on climate finance, technology 
transfer, capacity building, and the Enhanced Transparency Framework through the 
lens of the Africa Group. 
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I. Understanding the Adaptation vs. Mitigation Positions 
 
I.  1. Definitions of Adaptation and Mitigation 
Adaptation 
Adaptation in this investigation will be referred to in the context of its IPCC Third 
Assessment Report definition (IPCC, 2001). This definition below of adaptation 
reflects the pluralistic approach and multifaceted cluster of efforts encompassing 
adaptation. 
 
Adaptation refers to adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts. It 
refers to changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential 
damages or to benefit from opportunities associated with climate change 
(IPCC, 2001). 
 
In line with this definition, adaptation efforts aim to ensure that any approved 
technologies or climate actions are appropriate for specific communities. Adaptation 
under the Paris Agreement considers the interconnectedness of climate change to 
human dimensions and ranges from actions of crop diversification to the 
implementation of early warning systems (Lesnikowski et al, 2016). If carefully 
designed with the appropriate capacity building support, adaptation efforts may 
strengthen national institutions to facilitate ownership over climate actions to 
potentially enhance country driven efforts.  
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Mitigation 
Mitigation is defined as the human interventions made to reduce GHG emissions into 
the atmosphere or to enhance GHG sinks and reservoirs such as forests (IPCC, 2001). 
Mitigation initiatives, although they have always been important, are becoming 
increasingly necessary as climate change intensifies. On a large scale, mitigation 
actions might range from the re-designing of existing cities to reduce fossil fuel 
reliance, to transitioning to 100% renewable cities. On a smaller scale, mitigation 
includes improving dated, less efficient technologies, for example, transitioning from 
traditional cook stoves reliant on biomass towards clean cook stoves.  
 
I .  2. Trajectory of the Adaptation Versus Mitigation Position 
Over the history of international climate change governance, mitigation has been an 
overriding priority over adaptation. While some Parties have supported the historical 
prioritization of mitigation, others have been greatly dissatisfied. The opposing views 
on this issue have essentially created two positions of debate on the matter; one in 
support for the prioritization of adaptation, and another in support for mitigation. The 
purpose of this section is to provide insight to the opposing positions dividing Parties 
in the negotiations. I will give particular attention to Africa’s position in the debate 
which will provide a foundation to understand the broad perspective of the 
negotiating bloc’s request for a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the 
implementation of NDCs.  
The prioritization of mitigation in the climate governance architecture dates 
back to the inception of the Convention and its objective. 
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The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments 
that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be 
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally 
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner (UN, 1992, 
Article 2). 
 
The Convention’s objective begins by prioritizing mitigation, through its 
explicit attention to tackling GHG emissions. The objective then refers to adaptation 
but does so in a narrow context, noting only the role of adaptation for economic 
development and food security. Although both adaptation and mitigation are 
referenced in the Convention’s objective, mitigation efforts have nevertheless 
presided over adaptation.  
The historical prioritization of mitigation was in response to the scientific 
findings of the IPCCs First Assessment Report (IPCC, 1990) that identified that an 
increase in GHG would pose considerable threats to the stability of the environment. 
These findings were made prior to the realization that the impacts of climate change 
would require extensive adaptation efforts for community resilience and in some 
cases, survival. Given the limited understanding of climate change at the time, it is 
understandable that the international community through the UNFCCC dedicated its 
efforts on limiting climate change by focusing on GHG emissions reductions.  
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This prioritization of mitigation over adaptation as a means to control global 
temperature rise continued for many years. Mitigation was also the prioritized climate 
action at the heart of the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol, which enforced 
mandatory GHG emission reduction targets for Annex I Parties (UNFCCC, 1997). 
While Parties focused on tackling GHG emissions, it was becoming increasingly 
apparent that the already locked in GHGs emitted largely during the industrialization 
of the ‘global north’ were leading to environmental changes. These environmental 
changes appeared to be global, with increasing rainfall patterns in some areas, and 
drought in others, severely affecting the agriculture and livelihoods of many around 
the globe. In addition, increasing accounts of accelerated sea level rise and the 
intensification and frequency of extreme weather events were reported (IPCC, 2001; 
IPCC, 2014). As these impacts were disproportionately experienced by the ‘global 
south’, non-Annex I Parties had to engage in greater efforts to adapt to these impacts. 
It is no surprise that non-Annex I Parties began requesting a greater prioritization of 
adaptation in the climate governance structure in the hopes that adaptation support 
would receive the same provisions as mitigation. 
The ongoing prioritization of mitigation over adaptation despite the increasing 
reports of climate change impacts and its detrimental effects began to divide Parties 
based on whether they supported the prioritization of adaptation or mitigation. On the 
one hand, developing countries have remained keen to prioritize adaptation, which is 
essential for enhancing their capacity to adapt and to become more resilient to the 
impacts of climate change. Thus, developing countries have worked to increase the 
status of adaptation in the negotiations. On the other hand, developed countries have 
supported the prioritization of mitigation. Some developed countries have 
traditionally resisted the prioritization of adaptation because of the great financial 
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costs associated with adaptation. These costs are of particular concern to developed 
countries that are obliged, under the Convention to provide financial support to 
developing countries for their adaptation needs. 
The diverging views on this topic have lent themselves to the ongoing debate 
over the need for a greater balance between adaptation and mitigation. The difference 
of views on this issue will be explored below and will be referred to as the ‘adaptation 
versus mitigation debate’. 
 
Rationale for the Adaptation Position 
The push for balancing adaptation with mitigation in the climate negotiations has 
taken precedence for many non-Annex I Parties. Parties in support of this view will 
inform the ‘adaptation position’ of this MRP. The adaptation position prioritizes 
adaptation as a key climate response in the global climate effort. The driving force 
behind the adaptation position recognizes that adaptation has lagged behind 
mitigation for many years in the climate negotiations. The adaptation position aims 
to enhance the prominence of adaptation in the negotiations by allocating it a special 
attention in the hopes that that adaptation will become on a par with mitigation. The 
adaptation position gained much consideration during COP16 as Parties established 
the Cancun Adaptation Framework (UNFCCC, 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7, decision 
1/CP.16/ paragraph 1 (b)). Parties aimed to decrease the vulnerability of developing 
countries to the impacts of climate change and agreed that, “adaptation must be 
addressed with the same priority as mitigation” (paragraph 2(b)). 
In doing so, Parties advanced the details of the Adaptation Framework and 
its respective Adaptation Committee to ensure that an adequate institutional 
structure was in place to deal with adaptation. The Lima decision 1/CP20 
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(UNFCCC, 2014a, FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1) notes that, “Parties shall address in a 
balanced manner, inter alia, mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development 
and transfer, and capacity-building, and transparency of action and support” 
(paragraph 2). The explicit mention of these components in the Lima decision 
attempted to place adaptation on par with mitigation ahead of Paris- at least in the 
textual sense. In addition, the Lima decision invites all Parties to consider including 
adaptation in their INDCs (decision 1/CP20, paragraph 12) 
The invitation to include adaptation in the INDCs was a long time coming, 
and was well received by Parties; 137 of the 161 INDCs received before COP21 
included a component dedicated to adaptation (UNFCCC, 2016, FCCC/CP/2016/2, 
paragraph 59). The opportunity presented by the UNFCCC for the inclusion of 
adaptation is reflective of the Convention’s dedication for an inclusive climate 
governance structure, shifting away from a mitigation dominated structure to one that 
purposefully considers adaptation. The widespread decision of individual Parties, 
particularly non-Annex I Parties to include adaptation in their INDCs is reflective of 
the need for greater adaptation support to assist Parties to pursue their national climate 
plans and sustainable development priorities.  
While this opportunity was presented to Parties at COP20, the details of this 
invitation had not been fully developed. Although Parties were eager to include 
adaptation in their INDCs, there were fundamental questions left unanswered in the 
lead up to COP21. These included concerns over what an adaptation NDC component 
would comprise of, including the extent to which support for adaptation would be 
available under the Convention in comparison to support available for mitigation. 
These questions reflect the primary concerns of developing countries as to how 
adaptation will be balanced with mitigation in the implementation of NDCs. With 
 
 
27 
adaptation having gained an appreciable amount of attention in the lead up to COP21, 
non-Annex I Parties became particularly concerned to ensure that the new climate 
Agreement would secure special support for their adaptation needs, further solidifying 
non-Annex I Parties support for the adaptation position. 
 
Rationale for the Mitigation Position  
The position in support for the continued prioritization of mitigation over adaptation 
will be referred to in this investigation as the ‘mitigation position’. The mitigation 
position is preeminent amongst Annex I Parties and favors approaches enabling the 
reduction of GHG emissions. This position is in sharp contrast to the adaptation 
position as it emphasizes the reduction of GHG above the need to adapt to the impacts 
of climate change. 
The mitigation position gained special attention at COP 16 when a long-term 
global temperature goal was established to keep the rise of temperatures below 2 °C 
of pre-industrial levels (UNFCCC, 2010, decision 1/CP16). Parties agreed that to 
achieve the temperature goal, they would have to ensure emission reductions through 
the implementation of low carbon technologies, while enhancing GHG sinks and 
reservoirs (decision 1CP/16, paragraph 43). Although all Parties recognize the 
importance of mitigation initiatives for achieving this temperature goal, tensions rose 
over who should take responsibility for mitigation. This emphasized the two opposing 
positions in the adaptation versus mitigation debate. Annex I Parties wanted 
developing countries to join in the burden of mitigation, while non-Annex I Parties 
wanted to focus their national efforts on enhancing their adaptive capacities 
(Hermwille, Obergassel, Ott, and Beuermann, 2015).   
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The opposing positions in the debate became more visible at COP17 at the 
launch of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP) (UNFCCC, 2011, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, decision 1/CP17). The ADP was 
mandated to negotiate a new climate agreement by 2015 in order to come into effect 
by 2020. The launch of the ADP presented a new hope for Annex I and non-Annex I 
Parties who each wanted to ascertain specific priorities in the new Agreement.  
For Annex I Parties, the ideal climate governance architecture would ensure 
that climate mitigation under the new Agreement is applicable to all Parties. For non-
Annex I Parties, the ideal new architecture under the ADP would prioritize adaptation 
so that adaptation could reach parity with mitigation.  
Annex I Parties solidified their dedication to mitigation, while insisting that 
they should not have to continue to face the disproportionate burden of responsibility 
for climate action as they did under the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, Annex I Parties 
demanded a more inclusive burden sharing structure for climate action under the Paris 
Agreement. Non-Annex I Parties on the contrary, solidified their dedication to 
adaptation and did not agree to relinquish the differential burden allocation for 
climate action. Instead, developing countries wanted mitigation responsibilities to be 
in coherence with the Principles of the 1992 Convention of Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). The 
architecture of the Paris Agreement treads carefully on this terrain and finds common 
ground between the opposing positions in the adaptation versus mitigation debate. In 
response, the Paris Agreement invites all Parties to take mitigation action, as insisted 
by Annex I Parties and allows mitigation contributions to be nationally determined by 
Parties to not impose a burden on non-Annex I Parties. 
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 I .  3. Position of the Africa Group  
Countries of the African Continent have engaged in the UNFCCC since its 
inception. Together, the Continent unifies its voice through a negotiating bloc 
representing 54 African countries known interchangeably as the Africa Group of 
Negotiators (AGN) or Africa Group (see UNFCCC Newsroom, Who’s who: 
Groupings and actors). The chair of the AGN rotates around African member States 
every two years. The AGN has presented the perspectives and experiences of 
African countries in a common position during the negotiations and has been an 
influential negotiating bloc over the years. Africa’s position in the adaptation versus 
mitigation debate has historically sided with developing countries in support of the 
prioritization of adaptation due to the special circumstances faced by African 
countries. 
 
The push for a Global Adaptation Goal  
In pursuing parity between adaptation and mitigation, the AGN was the leading force 
behind the proposal for a Global Goal for Adaptation (GGA), first proposed under the 
ADP in 2013 (see submission by Swaziland on behalf of the AGN, October 2013). 
The AGN insisted on a GGA framework that would facilitate balancing adaptation 
with mitigation. The GGA was intended to conduct assessments on the adequacy of 
support received by developing countries based on their adaptation needs. A core 
component of this proposal was matching the support available (particularly financial) 
for adaptation with the global temperature goal. The AGN anticipates that the less 
ambitious the temperature goal, the greater the damage that climate change will have 
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on developing countries, which will result in a greater financial burden for adaptation 
implementation.  
Eventually, the Paris Agreement established the Global Goal for Adaptation 
(UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 7). Parties at COP21 agreed that the purpose of the GGA 
is, “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability 
to climate change with a view to contributing to sustainable development and 
ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the global temperature 
goal” (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 7(1)). In response to these efforts, there are varying 
views on the potentials of the GGA. On the one hand, Lesnikowski et al., (2016) 
believe that the Paris Agreement and its commitment to a GGA presents an 
opportunity for the integration of adaptation with mitigation as it encourages 
contributions to be made to the Adaptation Fund, which is the primary fund created to 
assist with adaptation initiatives. On the other hand, Sharma (2016) and Spash (2016) 
believe that adaptation under the Paris Agreement is only provisionary and that work 
needs to be done to develop a clear roadmap for a long-term adaptation 
implementation pathway. Despite these varying views, the GGA is a much-needed 
platform for the AGN as it presents a structure to support Parties to enhance their 
country driven adaptation initiatives for climate action while facilitating national 
sustainable development goals. 
The architecture of the Paris Agreement establishes various support 
frameworks in order to operationalize the GGA. Specifically, decision 1/CP21 
(UNFCCC, 2015b, paragraph 124) establishes the Technical Examination Process on 
Adaptation (TEP-A). The main purpose of the TEP-A is to enhance adaptation by 
“identify[ing] concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing 
vulnerabilities and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation 
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actions” (UNFCCC, 2015b, paragraph, 125). In order for the TEP-A to contribute to 
the GGA, Parties will need to ensure that they engage in adequate reporting on 
adaptation, which will be explored in section II.4 of this chapter.  
 
Special circumstances of the African Continent 
The fifth and most recent IPCC Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014) confirms what 
many African delegates had already suspected. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most 
vulnerable regions in the world to the impacts of climate change, despite the fact that 
the entire African Continent is responsible for only 4% of global GHG emissions 
(CAIT, 2016). Africa’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change is exacerbated 
by a plethora of factors. Two of the main factors are the erosion of sustainable 
development initiatives and the low adaptive capacity of the Continent. 
First, the impacts of climate change are impeding many of the already existing 
sustainable development initiatives in African countries. Sustainable development 
initiatives focused on agriculture, clean drinking water, human health, and 
settlements, are amongst the most affected initiatives. The changing climate is 
intensifying rates of land degradation and drought as precipitation levels continue to 
decline across the sub-Saharan region, while other regions are anticipated to 
experience extreme rainfall (IPCC, 2014). This presents a huge challenge for 
freshwater lenses and agriculture that is vital for human sustenance.  
One-third of the Continents GDP and 65% of Africa’s labor force rely on the 
agricultural industry (New Partnership for Africa's Development, 2016). Thus, 
African economies and societies will be especially threatened by climate change. 
Precipitation and temperature fluctuations tend to increase the geographic range of 
vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and cholera that will impact human health 
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(IPCC, 2001). In addition, the rising temperatures exacerbate the intensity and 
frequency of extreme weather events and make more likely the risk of slow-onset 
events, including sea-level rise and desertification, which are anticipated to 
exacerbate climate induced displacement and threaten sustainable development 
(IPCC, 2014). 
Second, the Continent faces a low adaptive capacity. This may be attributed to 
the various challenges to land, human health, and settlements as explored above. 
Additional warming on the Continent may permanently lock-in climatic impacts, 
which will be detrimental to African livelihoods. The Secretariat’s Synthesis Report 
(UNFCCC, 2015c) suggests that a 3.4 °C - 3.7 °C warming would bring 
unprecedented climate variability to the African Continent. Specifically for Africa, a 
warming close to 4 °C could lead to an increase of temperatures of up to 6 °C. At this 
temperature point, it would be almost impossible for communities to adapt (African 
Development Bank, 2015). High poverty levels on the Continent have placed millions 
on the margins of survival, and for these communities, even the slightest change in 
climatic conditions may have a devastating effect (Ngwadla and El-Bakri, 2016).  
These factors associated with a changing climate greatly undermine 
sustainable development efforts, making communities vulnerable and increasing the 
cost of adaptation. As a result, the AGN is concerned with the widening adaptation 
gap. This is the financial gap between funds currently available for adaptation efforts 
and the estimated costs of adaptation. In considering this adaptation gap and the 
special circumstances of the continent there is little surprise that securing support for 
adaptation until it becomes on par with mitigation is a priority for the Continent (see 
submission by the Republic of Mali on behalf of the AGN, February 2016a).  
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I.  4. Africa’s Leadership in Adaptation and Mitigation  
While adaptation has historically been an overriding priority for the Continent, the 
AGN has taken action to ensure that African countries are part of the solution. 
Demonstrating this commitment is that all African countries (with the exception of 
Libya) submitted an NDC to the UNFCCC, providing insight to the efforts of African 
countries to link their domestic climate actions to the international climate goals of 
the Paris Agreement.  
Given the commitment of the AGN to the global climate effort, it is 
imperative to note that the commonly held belief that Africa’s “primary stake in the 
climate negotiations is to secure more aid” is largely inaccurate and misleading 
(Africa Progress Panel, 2015, p. 135). Africa’s commitment to the climate effort and 
the objective of the Convention was highlighted by the Executive Secretary of the 
Economic Commission for Africa, Dr. Carlos Lopes, during a side event. He stated, 
“Africans do not want to be passive actors in this debate, they do not want to be 
residual receivers of funds or aid for climate adaptation. Africans want to be part of 
the solution” (Africa Day at the African Pavilion, COP 21, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development Reporting Services, 1 December 2015). 
The Africa Group’s commitment to be part of the solution is evident in three 
notable climate action initiatives. The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative is one of 
such efforts and aims to unlock Africa’s renewable energy potential by 2030 (see joint 
statement issued on behalf of the French Government, 8 December 2015). The Africa 
Adaptation Initiative is another example, and it intends to enhance support to Africa 
on issues of adaptation and loss and damage (Omari-Motsumi, 2016). Third is the 
Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa Initiative, launched by the African 
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Development Bank which aims to address the disproportionate financing gaps faced 
by women for climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts (African Development 
Bank, 2016).  
This chapter has identified that developing countries have prioritized 
adaptation over mitigation in the negotiations in order to secure support to meet the 
immediate needs of their people. Thus far, this chapter has explored the contrasting 
sides of the adaptation versus mitigation debate outlining the unique circumstances of 
the Continent, and its particular need for adaptation support. In order to make 
progress towards the implementation of NDCs of developing countries, the means of 
implementation (MOI) and support available to Parties will be crucial. The remainder 
of this chapter will provide an overview of the MOI available to developing countries 
under the Convention and the Paris Agreement through the perspective of the Africa 
Group. 
 
II. Means of Implementation 
 
The extent to which Parties are able to exceed or merely achieve their adaptation and 
mitigation NDC plans will depend on their access to Means of Implementation (MOI) 
support. This includes financial, technological, and capacity building support in 
particular. Fortunately, there are existing support provisions and mechanisms 
established under the UNFCCC, however, in order for this support to be effective, the 
Parties will need to ensure that a careful balance between adaptation and mitigation is 
met so that Parties do not have to forgo one form of climate action for another. 
Developing countries have been emphatic that, “nothing under the UNFCCC can be 
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achieved without the provision of means of implementation to enable developing 
countries to play their part to address climate change” (see statement by South Africa 
on behalf of G 77 and China, 2 December 2015). This statement emphasizes the 
rhetoric of developing countries in attempt to secure support for their NDC 
implementation and particularly adaptation actions. 
 
 II.  1. Climate Change Finance 
Definition 
Climate change finance, hereby ‘climate finance’, does not have an agreed upon 
definition under the UNFCCC. In this MRP climate finance will be referred to as 
finance that is dedicated to actions to “reduce emissions, and enhance sinks of 
greenhouse gases and aim to reduce vulnerability of, and maintain and increase the 
resilience of, human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts” 
(UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance, 2014, p. 2) 
Reliable and predictable climate finance is pivotal for adaptation initiatives 
and for enhancing the adaptive capacities of communities to reduce the 
disproportionate burden of climate change on vulnerable communities. Climate 
finance is also important for mitigation as it mobilizes the investments necessary to 
scale-up resources for a low carbon, resilient development pathway.  
As discussed in the UNFCCC 
The Copenhagen COP15 (UNFCCC, 2009, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1) achieved 
notable progress for long-term climate finance as Annex I Parties committed to jointly 
mobilizing USD100 billion per year by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2009, decision 2/CP.15, 
paragraph 8). The Green Climate Fund, which is the main distributive fund for 
climate finance, demands that any finance provided through its institutional 
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arrangements must be directed towards low GHG emission initiatives (decision 
2/CP.15, paragraph 10). This form of financial support dedicated to low carbon 
intensive growth is important to developing countries striving for a climate resilient 
development pathway.  
Since COP15, developing country Parties have begun to gather climate 
finance. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
released a report on the mobilization of climate finance, estimating that pledges to the 
Green Climate Fund from Annex I Parties has increased from USD 52 billion in 2013, 
to USD 62 billion in 2014 (OECD, 2015). Tensions rose in Paris, as often happens 
over climate finance, as developing countries felt that the OECD had exaggerated the 
progress made towards the $100 billion climate finance goal. 
India in particular noted concerns over transparency and the methodology 
used in the OECD report. India’s Economic Ministry released a follow up report 
noting that available climate finance for developing countries is in fact as low as USD 
2.2 billion (India Climate Change Finance Unit, 2015). This aired tensions between 
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties over the availability of climate finance. 
Disagreements over the finance mechanism under the UNFCCC continued at 
COP21 upon the release of a draft text by the co-Chairs. The draft text noted that 
developing countries with rapidly growing economies could be expected to join 
developed countries to contribute to climate finance (see draft agreement and draft 
decision on work streams 1 and 2 of the ADP 2.12, 4 December 2015). Not 
surprisingly, developing countries disapproved the call for Parties with emerging 
markets to be burdened by an expectation to contribute to climate finance. The G 77 
& China Group responded to the draft text by reminding developed country Parties of 
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their financial obligations to developing countries under Article 3 of the Convention 
along with of the principle of CBDR-RC. The statement by the G 77 and China reads, 
Under the Convention, developed countries are obliged to provide financial 
resources, including technology transfer and capacity building to all 
developing countries. This is a legal obligation under the Convention. It is 
neither “aid” nor “charity”, nor is it the same as development assistance (…) 
(see statement by South Africa on behalf of G 77 and China, 2 December 
2015). 
 
 The intervention affirms the frustrations of developing countries insistent that 
Annex I Parties should take their obligatory financial commitments under the 
Convention seriously. The differing perspectives of Parties made it difficult to find 
common ground in the negotiations on finance, tasking this agenda item to the 
Ministerial level at COP21 where eventually common ground was reached, albeit a 
weak one. It was decided that while Annex I Parties will provide financial resources 
to assist developing countries, all Parties including non-Annex I Parties are 
encouraged to provide voluntary financial support to assist the implementation of 
NDCs (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 9(1), 9(2)).  
 While the architecture of the Paris Agreement attempts to mobilize the climate 
finance mechanism, it does not provide precise information on what to expect from 
the mechanism. This has given developing countries little confidence in the 
availability and predictability of climate finance to support their climate actions. The 
uncertain availability of climate finance creates a barrier to the implementation of the 
NDCs, hindering developing countries from meeting their adaptation needs and 
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development priorities. This reality will be explored further in reference to a case 
study on the Kingdom of Swaziland in chapter 3. 
 
Africa Group perspective 
The uncertainty over the predictability of climate finance has put a spotlight on the 
adaptation versus mitigation debate, particularly as the African Continent faces a huge 
adaptation finance gap. The already limited funds available to the Africa Group for 
their climate efforts might oblige the AGN to continue to prioritize adaptation over 
mitigation in the NDC implementation in order to meet the immediate needs of its 
citizens.  
 Currently, the Continent has been receiving USD 0.5 billion – USD 3 billion 
per year which has been dedicated to adaptation initiatives. However, this falls short 
of the actual financial needs for adaptation on the Continent. The Report on Africa’s 
Adaptation Gap (Schaeffer et al., 2013) reveals the adaptation costs to the Continent 
in three scenarios. The first scenario captures adaptation costs as a result of past 
emissions. These costs are anticipated between USD 7 billion – USD 15 billion 
annually by 2020. Second, the Report explores the financial needs of the Africa 
Group should the 2 °C temperature goal of the Paris Agreement be met. The report 
finds that a 2 °C temperature rise by 2050 would drive adaptation costs to 
approximately USD 35 billion per year. The third scenario is in line with pledges 
noted in INDC submissions before Paris which have estimated warming to be 
anywhere between 3.5 °C – 4 °C. In this scenario, assuming all Parties actually fulfill 
their INDCs, adaptation costs for Africa would range between USD 50 billion per 
year by 2050 and USD 350 billion by 2070 (Schaeffer et al., 2013). In all three of the 
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scenarios presented, the costs for adaptation on the Continent are alarmingly high and 
emphasize the large funding gap for adaptation.  
 The funding gap for adaptation is a common concern for negotiating 
blocs representing developing countries. As a result, in Paris the COP urged 
developed countries to prepare to scale-up their financial pledges by 2025 for a new 
quantified goal that would start from a floor of USD 100 billion (UNFCCC, 2015b, 
paragraph 53). Despite this textual development, little headway was made on the 
details of this additional finance, making it difficult for developing countries to 
consider fulfilling both adaptation and mitigation initiatives in tandem. In working 
towards an NDC implementation phase where adaptation is on par with mitigation, 
the details of climate finance and the adaptation finance gap must be addressed 
urgently.  
 
 II.  2. Technology Development and Transfer 
Definition 
In this MRP, technology development and transfer will be referred to in its IPCC 
definition, “a broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience, and 
equipment for mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different 
stakeholders” (IPCC, 2000, p.3). In working towards enhancing technology 
development and transfer for an enhanced access to environmentally sound 
technologies, the Marrakech Accords established a Technology Transfer Framework 
(UNFCCC, 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, decision 4/CP.7).  
The Technology Transfer Framework aims to enhance the implementation of 
the UNFCCC Convention (UN, 1992, Article 4(5)) to facilitate technology 
development and transfer to developing countries. The Technology Framework works 
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in collaboration with the Technology Mechanism (UNFCCC, 2010) to expand its 
outreach. The Technology Transfer Framework and Technology Mechanism are 
essential for overall technology development and transfer for ambitious climate 
action.  
For adaptation, technology development and transfer can reduce vulnerability 
to climate change by increasing the adaptive capacity of communities. For mitigation, 
technology development and transfer will be crucial for achieving large and small-
scale reductions in global GHG emissions.  
 
As discussed at the UNFCCC 
The Technology Mechanism established at COP 16 recognizes the crucial role of 
technology for realizing the objectives of the Convention (UNFCCC, 2010, decision 
1/CP16, paragraph, 117). The Mechanism consists of the Technology Executive 
Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The 
TEC was created under the Technology Mechanism as its ‘policy arm’ to identify 
appropriate policies to accelerate technology development and transfer for low carbon 
technologies (decision 1/CP16, paragraph 117(a)). The CTCN serves as the 
Mechanism’s ‘operational arm’, which is informed by the TEC and is the 
implementation body of the Technology Mechanism. The CTCN aims to foster 
partnerships between stakeholders and promote innovation on matters related to 
technology development and transfer (paragraph 123(ii)).  
Although not questioned for its significance, technology development and 
transfer has been out of the “limelight of negotiations” (Obergassel, 2016, p 31) in 
recent sessions. Perhaps this was due to progress being made by the respective 
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Subsidiary Bodies in association with the TEC and CTCN and Parties were 
anticipating advances on this agenda item to proceed in Paris.  
In Paris, the Africa Group led a ‘spin-off-group’ for the launch of a 
Technology Framework to guide the Technology Mechanism, and these efforts were 
well received by Parties (see International Institute for Sustainable Development 
Reporting Services, Paris Highlights: Wednesday, 1 December, 2015, p.4). Article 10 
of the Paris Agreement reflects this proposal and establishes a Technology 
Framework to provide overarching guidance to the Technology Mechanism. 
Specifically, it intends to promote “enhanced action on technology development and 
transfer” to support the implementation of the Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 
10 (4)). The specific details of the Technology Framework will continue to be 
developed in the upcoming negotiations. In the meantime however, the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) has been requested to further 
elaborate on updating the Technology Needs Assessments (TNA) of developing 
country Parties and to scale-up appropriate technical and financial support. 
Information gathered by the TNA as will be explored in Chapter 3, is especially 
useful to understand Parties’ specific needs and barriers to technology access. 
As technology development and transfer continues to gain traction in the NDC 
implementation discussions, Glachant and Dechezleprêtre (2016) note the contrasting 
views of Parties regarding technology transfer. On the one hand, developed countries 
are concerned that ambitious technology transfer might reduce investments to their 
intellectual assets nationally, and on the other hand, developing countries increasingly 
request the assistance of developed countries to facilitate technology transfer. These 
varying outlooks of Parties have led to two main challenges faced by developing 
countries in technology development and transfer. These include access to technology 
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because of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and access to finance (see submission 
from Government of India to SBSTA, 14 September 2016, p.10). Although not 
explicitly mentioned in the text, the debate of whether to include the term ‘IPR’ in the 
Agreement presented a divide between parties on the issue. As a result, the barrier of 
IRP is insinuated in the text by the agreed term, “access”. From the perspective of 
developing countries, technology ‘access’ under the Paris Agreement acknowledges 
that the existing technology framework encourages research and development, 
however, IPRs still hinder countries from benefiting from technology ‘spill-overs’ 
(see submission from Algeria on behalf of Like Minded Developing Countries, 17 
October 2016). Glachant and Dechezleprêtre (2016) suggest that the reason that the 
exchange of IPR patents between developed and developing countries has remained at 
a low 16% is because of a lack of trust that patent owners in the ‘global north’ have 
for the enforcement of IPRs in developing countries, hindering the process of 
technology development and transfer.  
A significant success for developing countries out of COP21 has been the 
progress made towards enhancing technology transfer through collaboration with the 
Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC as per decision 13/CP21 (UNFCCC, 2015b). 
This collaboration aims to improve support to developing countries to fulfill their 
mitigation and adaptation actions (UNFCCC, 2015b, paragraph 10). The 
operationalization of the technology transfer mechanism is important for developing 
countries, and especially the Africa Group to work towards alleviating existing 
barriers to technology access for NDC implementation.  
 
Africa Group perspective 
While there seems to be much potential under the Technology Framework for 
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enhancing technology access, the specific details are still being negotiated, and this 
will be no small task. A concern of the Africa Group is that only some developing 
countries with emerging markets have benefited from technology transfer thus far. 
This is largely due to the involvement of emerging markets in the global economy, 
leaving out many of Africa’s least developed countries from this process. Bridging 
this gap is going to be challenging as technology assistance is important for the NDC 
implementation of all developing countries. In addition to bridging this gap, the 
realities of IPR in the realm of technology transfer will continue to hinder the process.  
One of the greatest concerns of the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) for the 
Technology framework is embedded in the adaptation versus mitigation debate. For 
many African countries, access to appropriate technology is directly related to the 
improved wellbeing of citizens. For example, as is noted in the NDCs of many 
African countries, technology transfer is important for improved water management, 
more climate resilient agriculture, and early warning systems (see submission from 
Algeria on behalf of Like Minded Developing Countries, 17 October 2016). If 
developing countries are unable to access sufficient technology and financial support 
to fulfill their NDCs, developing countries will have to prioritize the already limited 
support received towards the implementation of adaptation initiatives.  
Although this perspective is understandable, a limited access to technology 
(and of course finance) presents a challenge for the future stability of the climate. A 
delay of mitigation action amongst emerging markets that have had to prioritize 
adaptation given their realities on the ground, poses a significant global concern as is 
emphasized in the Secretariat’s Synthesis Report (UNFCCC, 2015c). The full NDC 
implementation of all Parties is essential for a minimum 2 °C temperature rise. 
Similarly, as is the case with climate finance, the Technology Framework and its 
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details must be carefully crafted in subsequent negotiations to ensure adequate 
support to assist Parties to fulfill their adaptation and mitigation contributions.  
 
II.  3. Capacity Building 
Definition 
In this MRP, capacity building will be referred to in its IPCC definition, “developing 
the technical skills and institutional capabilities in developing countries and 
economies in transition to enable their participation in all aspects” of climate change 
action (IPCC, 2007, p. 871).  
 
As discussed at the UNFCCC  
While the details of capacity building are still being developed, the Paris Agreement 
aims to ensure that capacity building initiatives will enhance the capacities and 
abilities of countries made most vulnerable to climate change. The nature of capacity 
building is crosscutting, and the Paris Agreement puts its best foot forward to capture 
this multifaceted dimension.  
Under the Paris Agreement, capacity building is in reference to enhancing 
climate change action through the implementation of “adaptation and mitigation 
actions, the facilitation of technology development, dissemination and deployment, 
access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public 
awareness, and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information” 
(UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 11(1)). With this intersectional focus, capacity building 
under the Paris Agreement provides a unique opportunity for the improved 
coordination across various mechanisms of the Convention.  
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The Paris Committee on Capacity building (PCCB) established in paragraph 
71 of decision 1/CP.21 (UNFCCC, 2015b) attempts to meet the capacity building 
priorities of developing countries. Specifically, the PCCB will aim to assist in 
identifying the exact areas requiring capacity support for individual countries as per 
their NDCs. An anticipated challenge with capacity building is the provision of 
finance for its associated initiatives. Finance for capacity building was not settled as 
an obligation of Parties under the Paris Agreement. Instead, it is a recommendation by 
the COP (Article 11(3)).  
Along with the PCCB, the Paris Agreement launched the Capacity Building 
Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) to support non-Annex I Parties to meet the 
requirements of the Enhanced Transparency Framework of Article 13 (UNFCCC, 
2015b, paragraph 84). While support to the CBIT under the Paris Agreement is 
obligatory, the Agreement does not identify the details of support, nor from whom 
support will be received. Thus, similar to climate finance and the technology 
framework, as Parties continue to develop the capacity building framework, the 
details will determine the true potential of the framework for developing countries. 
The intersectional nature of capacity building carries great importance for assisting 
developing countries in the implementation of the NDCs. Despite this importance, 
capacity building, as will be further elaborated on in Chapter 3, will prove to be a 
considerable barrier to implementation of the NDCs for developing countries such as 
Swaziland.  
 
Africa Group perspective 
For the Africa Group, capacity building is about “acquiring skills, strengthening 
institutions, and strengthen legal and policy frameworks to facilitate effective 
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implementation of mitigation and adaptation activities” (see submission by Republic 
of Mali on behalf of the AGN, 15 September 2016b). An enhanced adaptive capacity 
of Parties through capacity building for adaptation in particular, may increase the 
mainstreaming of climate change into national development agendas, which may in 
turn, enhance the effectiveness of ongoing climate projects.  
Although the MOIs explored thus far will assist with the implementation of 
NDCs, chapter 1 highlighted that the implementation of the NDCs alone will not be 
enough to limit warming to 2 °C and certainly not 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2015c). As a 
result, Parties will have to ratchet-up their NDC ambition in order to inch closer 
towards 2 °C. Accordingly, the Paris Agreement implements an Enhanced 
Transparency Framework and a Global Stocktake to ensure a scale-up of Party 
commitments and contributions over time.  
 
II.  4. Enhanced Transparency Framework and Global Stocktake  
Definition 
The Enhanced Transparency Framework does not have an agreed upon definition 
under the UNFCCC. In this MRP, the Enhanced Transparency Framework is in 
reference to the range of provisions including the monitoring, reporting, and the 
verification of data submitted (UNFCCC, 2014b). The data submitted by Parties 
through the transparency framework will also inform the Global Stocktake which will 
‘take stock’ of the progress made by Parties towards the Paris Agreement. 
 
As discussed at the UNFCCC  
The significance of transparency has been emphasized since the inception of the 
UNFCCC (UN, 1992, Article 12). Given the important role of transparency and its 
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support provisions to the global climate effort, it is no surprise that a provision for 
transparency was established early on in the negotiations. The Nairobi Work 
Programme of decision 2/CP11 (UNFCCC, 2005, FCCC/CP/2005/5/Add.1) 
established an Adaptation Knowledge Portal intended to serve as a hub to support 
adaptation actions. This knowledge platform includes support to developing countries 
on the reporting and evaluation of their adaptation actions. The Paris Agreement 
builds on the efforts of the Nairobi Work Programme to enhance adaptation reporting 
through its frameworks on transparency and capacity building. Reporting and 
transparency have increased in significance over the years to become the backbone of 
the Paris Agreement. The Enhanced Transparency Framework introduces a common 
system of reporting for transparency where all Parties must report their emissions and 
track progress made towards meeting their NDCs (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 
13(7)(a)). Through the common reporting structure, Parties will be able to access up-
to date information and gauge their collective progress made towards the goals of the 
Agreement and the objectives of the Convention.  
The structure of the Paris Agreement encourages Parties to produce and 
submit Adaptation Communications to the UNFCCC (Article 7(10) and 7(11)). The 
Agreement notes the information that Parties should include in their adaptation 
communications. Amongst this information includes the priorities and implementation 
needs of Parties. These communications, similar to National Communications, will be 
recorded in an accessible and public registry in order to allow for a review of the 
overall progress made by Parties towards the Global Goal on Adaptation during the 
Global Stocktake (Lyster, 2017). 
The Global Stocktake as established in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, 
schedules its first session in 2023, and subsequent sessions every five years thereafter. 
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While the details of the Global Stocktake continue to be developed, its purpose is to 
periodically take stock of the collective progress made towards the Paris Agreement 
in light of equity and the best available science (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 14(1)). 
Access to this information, will provide insight to the specific barriers or concerns of 
Parties that may be hindering the implementation process of the NDCs. The Global 
Stocktake is to be comprehensive in nature, taking into account overall NDC 
progress. This process will be an integral component to understand the realities of 
Parties, and this will allow for the MOI structures to be better targeted to the specific 
support needs of Parties during the NDC implementation (Holz and Ngwadla, 2016).  
The details of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global 
Stocktake are still being developed and will likely continue until 2018, when the new 
transparency mechanism is to be negotiated. In the mean time however, the Enhanced 
Transparency Framework has been established with built-in flexibility, which takes 
into account the different capacities of Parties (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 13(1)). 
Given the varying capacities and circumstances of Parties, flexibility on reporting is 
provided to the Least Developed Country group (LDCs). This is to ensure that the 
Enhanced Transparency Framework is implemented in a manner that is, “facilitative, 
non-intrusive, non-punitive, [and] respectful of national sovereignty” (Article 13(3)). 
Essentially, the Enhanced Transparency Framework intends to avoid placing an 
additional burden on LDCs. Despite this flexibility provision, data provided by all 
Parties is subject to a review and a process of multilateral scrutiny to ensure that the 
reporting of Parties is accurate and comparable. 
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Africa Group perspective 
Reporting under the Enhanced Transparency Framework and the Global Stocktake 
presents various prospects for the Africa Group, in particular with regards to 
inclusivity and sovereignty. Although there are great potentials presented with a 
strong reporting mechanism, there are of course challenges faced by developing 
countries in adhering to the reporting requirements. Chapter 3 will provide a synopsis 
of these barriers as experienced by the Kingdom of Swaziland. Despite these 
challenges, reporting presents an important potential for the Africa Group. 
As the architecture of the Paris Agreement is inclusive in nature, it requires all 
Parties to play their part, and for the first time, developing countries have agreed to 
participate in a review process of their reported data. While reporting will be 
important for adaptation and mitigation efforts, it presents an enhanced opportunity to 
further adaptation. The Enhanced Transparency Framework provides a platform for 
Parties to share and learn from the best practices and experiences of one another. In 
addition, clear reporting presents a greater chance for the matching of financial and 
technical support from Parties as countries are to present their needs and concerns in a 
public forum. This will allow the Africa Group to focus on securing support for their 
adaptation needs in particular. The Enhanced Transparency Framework also has 
potential to serve the international community in interpreting the commitments and 
pledges made by Parties into climate actions. The potentials presented by this 
framework to the Africa Group will be explored further in chapter 4. 
This chapter has aimed to shed light on the general importance of adaptation 
from the perspective of the Africa Group. The chapter provides context to the crux of 
the positions around adaptation and mitigation in the implementation of NDCs, noting 
that a historical prioritization of mitigation has left developing countries to have to fill 
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existing adaptation gaps. In examining the MOIs under the architecture of the Paris 
Agreement, this chapter has revealed that the MOIs can assist in the process of 
balancing adaptation with mitigation by calling attention to the needs of developing 
countries. The next chapter will examine these issues from the lens of a member of 
the AGN, the Kingdom of Swaziland, where I will identify the constraints and needs 
for Swaziland’s NDC implementation. 
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CHAPTER 3    Swaziland 
 
 
This chapter will examine how the issues of NDC implementation raised in the 
previous chapter manifest on a national level through a case study on the Kingdom of 
Swaziland, a representative country of the Africa Group. I will explore the barriers 
faced by Swaziland in the NDC implementation with a special focus on understanding 
how these barriers present a challenge for adaptation. The chapter will begin by 
providing a political, socio-economic, and environmental context to the Kingdom of 
Swaziland. It will then explore Swaziland’s Nationally Determined Contribution 
(NDC) outlining the Kingdom’s adaptation and mitigation priorities. The chapter will 
explore the concerns and needs of the Kingdom for the NDC implementation, 
highlighting a lack of political buy-in, technology access, capacity building, and 
finance. 
 
I. Country Context 
 
The Kingdom of Swaziland is a small, landlocked country located in the southeastern 
part of the African Continent. Bordered by South Africa to the north, south and west 
and Mozambique to the east, the Kingdom covers 17,364 km2 and is home to a 
population of 1, 056 000 (TNC, 20161).  
 
                                                            
1 Swaziland’s Third National Communication (TNC) is produced by the Kingdom of Swaziland’s Ministry 
of Tourism and Environmental Affairs (2016). (To be cited as TNC in this MRP) 
 
 
52 
I.  1. Political Context 
As Africa's last remaining absolute monarchy, Swaziland has a unique governance 
structure consisting of both traditional institutions and ‘modern’, western methods of 
governance. Swaziland gained independence from Britain in 1968. The then King of 
Swaziland, King Sobhuza II, took to power after the country’s first election in 1972, 
repealing the 1968 Constitution with the King’s Proclamation of 1973. Under this 
proclamation, King Sobhuza II banned all political Parties and ruled the Kingdom 
assuming all powers. Swaziland adopted its second Constitution in 2005, which 
recognized the importance of development for national prosperity (Kingdom of 
Swaziland, 2005). 
The Kingdom is currently under the rule of His Royal Majesty, King Mswati 
III who ascended to the throne in 1986. His Majesty’s political authority expands all 
regions of the Kingdom and governs the 55 administrative divisions of the Kingdom 
known as Tinkhundla through elected traditional chiefs (Brown, 2011).  
Swaziland’s Governance structure has incorporated a modern political and 
administrative institution with a traditional structure. The modern, semi-democratic, 
western governance structure allows citizens to elect political candidates pre-
approved by His Royal Majesty. The modern governance structure oversees the work 
of eight urban areas and their regional offices. The Tinkhundla system represents the 
traditional structure of the royal villages and chiefdoms embedded in Swazi culture 
and history. The Tinkhundla account for 55 Swazi districts and oversee community 
development in the rural areas (United Nations System Swaziland, 2010). Under the 
modern Parliament structure, there is a House of Assembly and House of Senate. The 
House of Assembly consists of 65 seats, 55 of which are held by the Tinkhundla chief 
representatives (Brown, 2011). The remaining 10 are for individuals directly 
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appointed by his Majesty. The House of Senate consists of 30 seats, 20 of which are 
seats appointed directly by His Majesty (Brown, 2011). Under the traditional 
Tinkhundla structure, His Majesty the King’s title changes to Ingwenyama (which 
translates to lion) and Chiefs are considered ‘local Kings’ reporting to Ingwenyama. 
Chiefs under the Tinkhundla structure provide a link between community members 
and the modern style government. Chiefs also inform their communities of any local 
development plans that may affect them, and are responsible for maintaining the 
welfare of their communities in relation to land planning, health, food security, and 
rule of law (Economic Commission for Africa, 2007).  
This dual governance structure which encompasses a modern and traditional 
court system operating independently of each other, has given way to Swaziland’s 
unique political context that continue to govern the Kingdom. While this presents the 
Kingdom with various unique opportunities for governance, it has also been a source 
of difficulty for decision-making, policy creation, and implementation. These 
challenges will be explored in detail in section III.1 of this chapter.  
 
I .  2. Socio-economic Context  
As a developing country, Swaziland continues to make progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals (Kingdom of Swaziland, Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, 2010). Swaziland faces considerable barriers to meeting 
their development priorities, let alone meeting His Majesty the King’s Vision of 
becoming a first world country by 2022 (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2013). Swaziland’s 
Annual Vulnerability Assessment Analysis Report (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2016) 
identifies that the Kingdom is particularly burdened by poor health due to high levels 
of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus  (HIV) and Acquired Immune Deficiency 
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Syndrome (AIDS), which has led to a low life expectancy and slow economic growth. 
Along with these socio-economic challenges, Swaziland has been lacking in capacity 
to conduct the research necessary to inform national policies and to implement 
appropriate support measures to reduce these hindrances to development (TNC, 
2016).  
 
Health 
Particularly concerning to Swaziland’s development has been high HIV/AIDS and 
Tuberculosis (TB) rates. Despite Swaziland’s small population size, Swaziland is 
ranked the country with the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in an adult population 
(NDC, 20152). Currently, 46.3% of youth between the ages of 20-24, and 56.5% of 
those between ages 25-29 are infected (NDC, 2015). The HIV/AIDS epidemic has not 
only required Swaziland’s government to allocate significant resources to increase 
awareness and establish adequate health provisions, but has also severely exacerbated 
poverty levels, dwarfing economic growth as the age group that is most affected is 
reflective of the age group who generally engage in the economy. 
 
Life expectancy 
Life expectancy in the Kingdom has increased from 2006 levels of 42 years to 45.6 
years in 2014 (TNC, 2016). Despite this improvement, largely a resultant of rigorous 
HIV/AIDS awareness and HIV/AIDS combatting strategies, Swaziland still has a low 
life expectancy in comparison to surrounding countries. Life expectancy is further 
stunted by climate change as its impacts are preventing those reliant directly on 
agricultural practices, who are also most affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic from 
                                                            
2 Swaziland’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) is produced by the Kingdom of Swaziland 
(2015). (To be cited as NDC in this MRP) 
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food security and a well balanced diet, which are essential for effective HIV/AIDS 
treatment. 
 
Economic growth 
Swaziland is considered a lower-middle income country, however, the country faces 
similar barriers to development as some of Africa’s least developed countries. For 
example, 63% of the population lives below the poverty line (TNC, 2016). While 
Agriculture has historically been a mainstay of the Swazi economy, the contribution 
of Agriculture to Swaziland’s GDP has fallen. This has been particularly burdensome 
on the Swazi economy as 70% of Swazis still depend on agriculture (TNC, 2016). 
Swaziland’s economic volatility is further enhanced by the Kingdom’s unique 
political and socio-economic determinants as explored earlier. In addition, 
Swaziland’s economy is poorly diversified and relies heavily on its neighboring 
country, South Africa. Swaziland’s primary exports include sugar, beef, textiles, 
forestry products and citrus, 70% of which are exported to South Africa and the 
European Union. As 80% of the country’s imports are from South Africa, 
Swaziland’s economy is especially susceptible to the economic circumstances of 
South Africa (TNC, 2016).  
 
I .  3. Environmental Context 
Swaziland is ranked as one of Africa’s ten smallest countries. While the Kingdom is 
small in terms of land coverage, Swaziland’s Third National Communication (TNC, 
2016) recognizes the Kingdom’s diversity in landscape, climate, and biodiversity. 
Swaziland hosts four physiographic regions; the Highveld, the Middleveld, the 
Lowveld, and the Lubombo escarpment. Each of which are characterized by different 
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climatic conditions. As Swaziland is located at the transition point of major climatic 
zones, the country faces droughts, floods, extreme temperature fluctuations, and 
frequent hailstorms (TNC, 2016).  
While the nation is prone to natural hazards such as floods in one area and 
droughts in another, the intensity and frequency of these weather events have been 
increasing over the years (Nkondze, Masuku, and Manyatsi, 2013). Global climate 
change models predict that Swaziland will experience a temperature increase of 2.5 
°C by 2050 (Nkondze, Masuku, and Manyatsi, 2013). This change in temperature is 
anticipated to reduce rainfall by 200 mm annually (Manyatsi et al., 2015). In addition, 
a lack of available water for crop production and livestock sustenance, as well as 
limited water for human consumption has put Swaziland’s population in a serious 
shortage of water, and continues to be exacerbated by the El Niňo phenomenon 
(Kingdom of Swaziland, 2016; Sukati, 2016). By February 2016, drought in 
Swaziland had become so prevalent that the government declared the Kingdom in a 
national state of emergency (Sukati, 2016). 
 
I.  4. National Climate Change Governance Arrangements 
Swaziland’s National Development Strategy (NDS) reflects His Majesty, King 
Mswati III’s vision to transition the Kingdom to a ‘First World’ country by the year 
2022, known as Vision 2022 (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2013). The main areas of 
concern identified in the NDS include environmental sustainability, economic 
prosperity, education, health, infrastructure, governance, and corruption. The 
inclusion of the environment in the NDS is important because Swaziland has only 
recently considered climate change a development priority (TNC, p.11). This has 
come to be due to the importance of securing adaptation for safeguarding the 
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Kingdom’s development priorities. 
 The governance of climate change in Swaziland is delegated to the 
Department of Meteorology (MET) which is housed in the Ministry of Tourism and 
Environmental Affairs (MTEA). The MTEA is responsible for Swaziland’s 
adaptation and mitigation initiatives as well as meeting the Kingdom’s reporting 
obligations under the UNFCCC. In 2010 the MTEA established a National Climate 
Change Committee (NCCC) comprising of governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders working towards an integrated and climate resilient development 
pathway (TNC, 2016). The NCCC has been implemented by the government of 
Swaziland to address and respond to the impacts of climate change. The NCCC 
informs Swaziland’s national policy framework on the national and international level 
(TNC, 2016). 
 
National Policy Framework  
In response to the threat that Swaziland’s socio-economic conditions pose to the 
country’s development priorities, Swaziland released their United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework of 2016-2020 (UNDAF) (United Nations, 2016). 
This document outlines Swaziland’s ongoing efforts to implement policies to better 
the socio-economic, and environmental conditions of the country. Unfortunately, the 
full implementation of the UNDAF has been hindered by the Kingdom’s lack of 
capacity on various levels. Particularly hindering the implementation of UNDAF is a 
lack of financial resources, technical capacity, and inadequate institutions to monitor 
and evaluate the implementation of important adaptation actions. Despite the 
challenges of implementation, the UNDAF is one example of the Kingdom’s attempts 
to better understand the conditions and needs of its citizens. 
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The NCCC developed the 2014 National Climate Change Strategy and Action 
Plan, which informed the Kingdom’s National Climate Change Policy (NCCP) 
approved by Cabinet in 2016. The NCCP, which is in line with the NDS (2013) aims 
to encourage low carbon growth while progressing towards the national sustainable 
development priorities of the country. While these efforts note considerable 
milestones for the Kingdom, a lack of adequate resources has hindered the UNDAF 
and the NCCP from their full implementation and potential (TNC, 2016).  
 
Swaziland and the UNFCCC 
On the international level, Swaziland has actively engaged in the UNFCCC since 
1995, when the Kingdom became a signatory to the Convention. The Kingdom then 
adopted the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, affirming Swaziland’s commitment to 
addressing climate change and the objectives of the Convention.  
While limited resources burden the Kingdom, Swaziland has nonetheless been 
able to meet its various reporting obligations to the UNFCCC. To date, Swaziland has 
submitted three National Communications to the UNFCCC; its most recent Third 
National Communication (TNC) submission is from 2016 (TNC, 2016). The TNC is 
particularly important as it depicts Swaziland’s most recent commitments to 
adaptation and mitigation in light of the Kingdom’s development priorities. Along 
with the TNC, the Kingdom of Swaziland prepared a report on the country’s 
Technology Needs Assessment For Climate Change Adaptation (TNA, 20163). With 
support from the Global Environment Facility and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), Swaziland’s TNA identifies sector specific technology and 
                                                            
3 Swaziland’s Technology Needs Assessment for Climate Change Adaptation (TNA) is produced by 
the Kingdom of Swaziland’s Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (2016). (To be cited to 
as TNA in this MRP) 
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capacity building needs of the Kingdom to meet its development priorities. Both the 
TNC and TNA have been essential for the preparation of Swaziland’s NDC and will 
be useful for informing climate resilient policy in Swaziland.  
 
II. Swaziland’s Nationally Determined Contributions   
 
At this point, this chapter has provided an overview of Swaziland’s political, socio-
economic, environmental, and climate governance landscape. This section aims to 
explore the diverse areas of implementation for climate action that concern the 
Kingdom. My intention is not to provide an analysis of Swaziland’s NDC, but instead 
is to highlight the diversity and ambition of the NDC, which will provide insight to 
the importance of adaptation for Swaziland.  
Swaziland submitted its INDC prior to the convening of COP21, and is proud 
to have been one of the first 12 African Countries to ratify the Paris Agreement. 
Central to Swaziland’s NDC is the fact that the Kingdom contributes less than 
0.002% to global GHG emissions yet; climate change impacts have and continue to 
be detrimental to the development and wellbeing of Swazis (TNC, 2016).  
 
II.  1. Adaptation Contributions 
Swaziland was one of the many countries that appreciated the opportunity to explore 
and present their adaptation priorities to the UNFCCC through the NDC structure. As 
will become clear, Swaziland’s adaptation NDC component is closely linked to the 
Kingdom’s sustainable development priorities, making adaptation an important 
priority. This section will provide an overview of the various sector specific 
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vulnerabilities of Swaziland including; the agricultural sector, water sector and 
biodiversity.  
 
Agricultural sector  
Swaziland’s Agricultural sector has been greatly affected by changing climatic 
conditions. Rainfall variations along with land degradation and soil erosion, which 
have become increasingly common, have exacerbated the severity of drought in the 
country (Mavuso, Manyatsi, and Vilane, 2015). Changing climatic conditions are 
anticipated to exacerbate high temperatures, longer dry periods, and increase the 
likelihood of crop destroying pests. The output from rain fed agriculture and livestock 
has already decreased by 30% since 2012. As a result, up to 75% of smallholder 
farmers who rely on rain-fed agriculture have been severely impacted by the reduced 
rainfall (TNC, 2016). Swaziland is also experiencing a 25.6% of child stunting, due to 
the malnourishment of children under 5 years of age. The impact of climate change on 
Swaziland’s agricultural sector has placed one-third of Swazi households on 
emergency food aid (TNA, 2016). 
 In response to concerns over agriculture, Swaziland’s NDC (2015) aims to 
reduce preventable agricultural losses with four strategies. First, the government plans 
to incorporate conservation tillage to reduce rates of soil erosion and land 
degradation. Second, the government plans to enhance crop diversification and 
greenhouse farming to reduce the disruptions caused by an unpredictable and 
changing climate to agricultural outputs. Third, Swaziland intends to invest in 
selective breeding, to allow farmers to breed more climate resistant livestock and 
crops. Finally, Swaziland plans to incorporate solar dryers in order to assist farmers to 
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dry produce so that in times of environmental uncertainty or drought for example, 
there may be fewer cases of severe food insecurity.  
 
Water sector 
As a water scarce country, unanticipated variations in water availability in Swaziland 
may impact the entire nation (TNC, 2016). Swaziland’s NDC acknowledges the issue 
of water scarcity and anticipates a further 40% reduction in river flows, which will 
severely affect food security. Exacerbated by the El Niño effect, Swaziland is 
experiencing the lowest water catchment levels ever recorded in the nation. In 
addition, Swaziland’s water resources are being stretched thin due to an increase in 
the country’s population and water usage. In response to the severe water shortage, 
water rations have been imposed on households in the nations capital for up to four 
days at a time (Times of Swaziland, 2016).  
Given the interconnectedness of Swaziland’s water resources to the 
livelihoods of Swazis, adaptation support for the water sector are an important 
component of the nation’s NDC. Specifically, support received for Swaziland’s NDC 
adaptation efforts for the water sector will include an integrated river basin 
management, rainwater harvesting techniques, and water recycling, amongst other 
strategies (NDC, 2015).  
 
Biodiversity and ecosystems sector 
Ecosystem management in Swaziland is critically important to the nation’s unique 
ecological diversity. Swaziland’s diverse ecosystems provide the nation with 
environmental and socio-economic benefits. In the environmental context, healthy 
ecosystems conduct important environmental functions, including water purification. 
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In the socio-economic context, Swaziland’s diverse and lush ecosystems, which 
continue to attract visitors, have been important to the tourism economy. Increasingly 
dry areas of the country are making ecosystems susceptible to forest fires, threatening 
the species diversity of Swaziland (TNC, 2016). 
  Swaziland’s NDC incorporates various factors to protect the Kingdom’s 
diverse ecosystems and species. Amongst these efforts include; the restoration of 
ecological infrastructures, while creating a long-term biodiversity and conservation 
management program (NDC, 2015). The government intends to facilitate these efforts 
through the implementation of agro-forestry, pest management, flood mapping, and 
land rehabilitation initiatives. This component of the NDC will require financial and 
capacity building support to be appropriately implemented.   
 
II.  2. Mitigation Contributions 
While Swaziland contributes less than 0.002% to global GHG levels (NDC, 2015), 
the government acknowledges the importance of the Kingdom’s initiatives in the 
global climate effort. Swaziland’s emissions as noted in its TNC (2016) are from 
three of the country’s main sectors; energy (31%), agriculture (33%), and industrial 
processes (34%). Although the potential of reducing emissions from these sources has 
been identified, the cost assessments for the necessary technologies are yet to be 
conducted.  
 
Energy sector 
Severely limited access to electricity in Swaziland remains a barrier to development 
as only 27% of the population currently has access to electricity (TNC, 2016). 
Swaziland’s electricity mix is heavily reliant on imports from its neighbours South 
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Africa and Mozambique; 80% of Swaziland’s electricity is imported (Swaziland 
Electricity Company, 2013).  While Swaziland has relied on the South African 
Electricity Supply Commission for many years, increasing energy import tariffs for 
electricity have become expensive for the Kingdom (Southern Times, 2012). As 
demand for South African electricity from rapidly developing African countries 
increases at a faster rate than in Swaziland due to its small population, Swaziland has 
incurred high prices for its energy imports. Consequently, the cost of electricity in 
Swaziland is the most expensive in the entire Southern African Development 
Community (Southern Times, 2012). 
Swaziland’s NDC (2015) notes its determination to shift away from its energy 
dependence on South Africa. In doing so, Swaziland aims to double the share of 
renewable energy from 16% to 32% by 2030. This will be done by expanding the use 
of biomass in the Kingdom. This NDC component, which is conditional on support 
received, intends to implement smaller-scale and decentralized renewable energy 
technologies.  
 
Transport sector 
The most recent nationally collected data of 2010 shows that 60% of emissions from 
the energy sector are from transportation (TNC, 2016). GHG emissions from vehicles 
amounted for 9% in 2010 thus, Swaziland intends to introduce a 10% ethanol blend in 
petrol for vehicle use by 2030. Making the switch to a 10% ethanol blend is intended 
to reduce GHG emissions from vehicles by 60% by 2050 (TNC, 2016). Second, this 
switch is anticipated to boost the sugar cane industry in Swaziland, where the ethanol 
blend will be sourced. The byproducts of the sugar cane industry, which include 
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bagasse and molasses, can both be used as feedstock for the production of ethanol 
necessary to make this transition in the transport sector (TNC, 2016). 
 
Industry sector 
Swaziland intends to switch its industrial reliance from coal to biomass. Swaziland 
also intends to transition away from the use of ozone depleting substances in industry 
through a phase process. In order to achieve this, the Swaziland Environment 
Authority banned the use and production of ozone depleting substances in the country 
in 2016, in line with Swaziland’s ratification of the Montreal Protocol (TNC, 2016).  
This section has explored the Kingdom’s diverse nationally determined 
contributions for adaptation and mitigation. Now that this landscape has been 
provided, I will conduct an exploration of the barriers to the implementation of the 
Kingdom’s NDC, which will outline the way that the barriers to Swaziland’s NDC 
implementation also hinder adaptation.  
 
III. Constraints, Gaps and Implementation Needs  
 
The full implementation of Swaziland’s NDC, provides the Kingdom with a unique 
opportunity to turn its nationally determined contributions that are in line with 
Swaziland’s sustainable development priorities into national actions. This section will 
explore the barriers faced by Swaziland in this process with a special focus on 
understanding how these barriers present a challenge for adaptation. 
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III.  1. Governance and Lack of Political Buy-in 
 
Adaptation versus mitigation debate 
Swaziland believes in the importance of both adaptation and mitigation initiatives for 
the wellbeing of its citizens. However, for the Kingdom, like many developing 
countries, adaptation has taken precedence because of the way that climate change has 
exacerbated poverty and food insecurity, threatening the lives of Swazis.  
Due to the various urgent socio-economic and environmental concerns of the 
Kingdom, Swaziland’s priorities as outlined in the country’s National Development 
Strategy (NDS) (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2013) are not limited to climate change. 
While climate change impacts are contributors to poverty, economic decline, poor 
health, and certainly food insecurity, Swaziland has had to allocate components of its 
national budget to combatting the direct threats to human life posed by deteriorating 
socio-economic and environmental conditions. These conditions have solidified 
Swaziland’s adaptation position in the adaptation versus mitigation debate. 
 
Dual Governance Structure 
Swaziland’s 2005 Constitution aims to enhance national prosperity and the promotion 
of rights that were not previously accounted for through the incorporation of both 
traditional and modern structures (Kingdom of Swaziland, 2005). The Constitution 
also aims to facilitate transparency and greater accountability amongst the Swazi 
government, by having both structures active in decision-making. Despite these 
efforts and potential benefits brought forth by the dual governance structure, the 
bicameral structure has presented the Kingdom with various challenges for policy 
making. 
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A particular challenge presented by the dual governance structure has been a 
differing of views on certain issues between the traditional and western governance 
structures. In Swaziland, both the traditional and western governance structures report 
and advise His Majesty on policy issues. On occasion, both structures advise His 
Majesty on the same issue, with contrasting advice, creating challenges for policy 
making. As a result, reaching consensus within the dual governance structure can be 
time consuming, and has slowed the country’s responsiveness to taking action on 
issues such as the environment. 
Second, as separate courts accompany the dual governance structure, 
responsibility for environmental action falls between administrative uncertainties. The 
2007 Economic Commission of Africa report (ECA) notes that although disputes are 
resolved much quicker and cheaper in traditional courts than under the modern court 
system, a challenge is that there is a lack of understanding about where the 
responsibility of jurisdiction for the environment lies between the traditional and 
modern government.  
 
III.  2. Barriers to Technology Access 
As a resource dependent country, Swaziland is disproportionately affected by the 
impacts of climate change. As a result, access to appropriate technology will be 
essential for achieving Swaziland’s diverse range of adaptation and mitigation NDC 
components.  
Despite the efforts of Swaziland to identify the specific country technology 
needs, Swaziland’s socio-economic realities have made the Kingdom less equipped to 
cope with adverse climate change impacts. While there has been institutional support 
provided to developing countries such as Swaziland under the UNFCCC, through the 
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Technology Mechanism and CTCN for improved technology access, Swaziland 
continues to face barriers to technology access. To date, Swaziland has undergone 
two Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs); one for mitigation in 2010 and another 
for adaptation in 2016.  
Chapter 2 makes the case that an institutionalized prioritization of mitigation 
over adaptation by the UNFCCC has been a challenge for the Africa Group of 
Negotiators (AGN). This prioritization is evident in Swaziland as the mitigation TNA 
was conducted in 2010, during a time where the country may have particularly 
benefited from an adaptation TNA. Swaziland waited an additional six years before 
receiving the support necessary to better understand the technologies needed to meet 
its adaptation priorities. Having received institutionalized support from the UNFCCC 
for adaptation earlier may have presented the Kingdom with the potential to alleviate 
various adaptation pressures that have exacerbated over time. 
During the TNA for adaptation, technology options for the agricultural, water, 
and biodiversity sectors were carefully investigated. The TNA process allowed 
experts to decide on the most appropriate technologies to be implemented through a 
multi-criteria analysis. In this process, technical experts considered various factors, 
including; capital costs, job creation, and environmental and social impacts (TNA, 
2016). While this investigation identified the most appropriate technologies for 
Swaziland’s adaptation needs, the TNA process is yet to identify the specific 
deployment barriers of the various technologies. Collecting this information will be 
essential before Swaziland commits to any particular technologies.  
Regardless of the technologies eventually decided on by technical experts, 
Swaziland will need to consider how to access the finance necessary for NDC 
implementation. In addition to finance, capacity building will play an important role, 
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as the implementation of technologies extends beyond securing the technologies 
themselves. The implementation of technologies will also require capacity building so 
that local experts can maintain the technologies. These issues of finance and capacity 
building for Swaziland will be explored in the remainder of this chapter.  
 
III.  3. Capacity Building 
Capacity building intersects with each of the adaptation and mitigation components 
explored in Swaziland’s NDC. Capacity building is not just important for Swaziland 
to implement its NDCs, but also to ensure that the actions implemented are durable 
and responsive to the capacity needs of citizens. This section will explore Swaziland’s 
capacity building barriers specifically for; data collection, climate change education 
and bridging institutional capacity gaps under the UNFCCC.  
 
Data collection and reporting 
Swaziland’s ad hoc institutional arrangements have created difficulties for the 
Kingdom to engage in data collection and reporting. While Swaziland’s National 
Meteorological Service collects atmospheric data, data collection is limited to 
temperature, humidity, hours of sunshine, atmospheric pressure, wind speed and 
direction, rainfall, lightning, and evaporation rates (TNC, 2016).  
Swaziland has a central statistics office (CSO) that actively collects data and 
reports on four sectors; the economy, agriculture, demography (population, mortality, 
and education) and information technology. Given the limited availability of funds, 
Swaziland’s CSO does not have a designated sector that focuses on issues of the 
environment, nor climate change. Through a special request, the CSO can collect 
specific data on climate change however, it would be time consuming and dependent 
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on the availability of resources. 
Swaziland’s TNC identifies the urgent need to enhance the capacity of local 
experts on collecting climate change data within the nation’s most vulnerable sectors. 
Given the volatile state of the climate, and the undisputable importance of remaining 
below 2 °C, all GHG data submitted to the UNFCCC by Parties, including those with 
low emissions like Swaziland, must report with accuracy on GHG emissions and 
sinks. Data collection has been particularly lacking for Swaziland’s GHG inventory 
reporting which is required by the UNFCCC. Due to a lack of technical capacity, 
Swaziland delegates its GHG inventory report to external consultants. While the 
country has met its reporting requirements to the UNFCCC, there has been no data 
collection archived for the periods. Similarly, data collection for the industry, waste 
and water sectors have had to be extrapolated. The lack of capacity for data collection 
and reporting is largely due to a lack of institutional memory and a lack of national 
technical expertise, enhanced by the outsourcing of national data collection and 
reporting processes (TNC, 2016). There is a need to enhance the technical capacity of 
national experts to be able to conduct this information within the affiliated national 
institutions in a consistent and accurate manner.  
While Swaziland has relied on and benefited from externally funded 
opportunities for data collection, available funding has sometimes supported projects 
that do not necessarily fit into the country’s specific capacity needs. Swaziland is 
actively trying to shift away from its reliance on ad hoc institutional arrangements 
through the request to Swazi Parliament for a permanent data collecting and reporting 
institution on climate change (TNC, 2016). The approval of this is pending from 
Parliament, and will likely depend on the availability of funds. A permanent 
institutional structure will be especially important as the MET and its various 
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implementation agencies embark in efforts to lead the Kingdom through its NDC 
implementation phase. Having a permanent institutional structure for data collection 
will allow for greater monitoring and reporting in a climate governance structure 
which for too long has been overburdened by a lack of resources and nationally 
trained experts.  
 
Climate change education and awareness 
The critical importance of enhancing awareness of climate change through capacity 
building has been emphasized in various national documents as well as external 
research reports. Swaziland’s National Communications to the UNFCCC identify the 
need for awareness and capacity building to better inform the public and government 
employees of the impacts of climate change.  
Generally in Swaziland, there is a low awareness of climate change and its 
impacts, including within Parliament. This has delayed the development of 
appropriate national climate action and policies. A study conducted by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development in partnership with 
European Parliamentarians for Africa (Brown, 2011) investigated the role of the 
Swazi Parliament in addressing climate change. The findings demonstrated that while 
some Members of Parliament had an understanding of the importance of climate 
change, many were unclear about the specific impacts of climate change on the 
Kingdom. Members of Parliament further articulated uncertainty on how the 
Kingdom should adapt to climate change and the sorts of policy and implementation 
strategies that would equip various ministries to appropriately deal with climate 
change. For many years climate change has not been governed by a clear Parliament 
response strategy, hindering climate action and particularly adaptation efforts across 
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the country.  
Similarly, the Southern African Regional Universities Association’s 
Swaziland Country Report (SARUA, 2014) identified the need for capacity building 
for education, training, and public awareness and highlights a lack of awareness over 
climate change as a significant barrier to adaptation. The investigation by SARUA 
conducted interviews on Ministry employees who are active in decision-making. The 
quote below from a Ministry employee suggests that there is an identified need for a 
greater awareness on climate change;  
 
We need specialists trained on climate change issues, adaptation, and 
mitigation in each and every Ministry or organization. Universities need to 
introduce programs on climate change long term or short term in order to 
capacitate communities. Communities must be well informed on issues of 
climate change and survival skills” (SARUA, 2014, p.36). 
 
Bridging institutional capacity gaps  
Improved data collection, reporting mechanisms and an increase in national 
awareness on climate change will present valuable contributions to the capacity of 
decision makers to deal with climate change in the Kingdom. Swaziland’s TNC 
(2016) notes that the primary institution that has been tasked to deal with climate 
change- the MTEA, is facing a severe shortage of trained staff for the NDC 
implementation. The MTEA will need to ensure the implementation of a specific 
capacity building coordination strategy that is inclusive of various stakeholders 
including; government, the private sector, and civil society organizations (TNC, 
2016). The MTEA will need to ensure the careful management of financial resources 
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and coordinate the various institutions accordingly so that any data collected is 
appropriate to fill existing research gaps. The Kingdom’s TNC (2016) notes the 
importance of better coordination between the Department of Meteorology and the 
Disaster Management Agency for more efficient adaptation operations. Similarly, in 
order to prepare for the full implementation of Swaziland’s NDC, there may need to 
be some restructuring of the various ministry departments to ensure clarity on 
individual and institutional roles and responsibilities.  
 
UNFCCC’s support for capacity building  
The extent of support that Swaziland will be able to secure under the Paris Committee 
on Capacity Building (PCCB) will remain uncertain until the details of the PCCB 
under the Paris Agreement are decided. Particularly concerning to Swaziland is the 
lack of obligation from developed countries to provide funding for capacity building, 
as Swaziland will rely considerably on capacity building support for the 
implementation of the NDC. 
One area that Swaziland has been approved capacity building support on is a 
Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN) initiative to “build capacity for 
climate change science” (Bafana and Ndhlangamandla on behalf of the Kingdom of 
Swaziland, 2016; 2017). The project to be funded by the CTCN is anticipated to 
enhance awareness of Swaziland’s climate change priorities and concerns in relation 
to the country’s development needs. This is to be achieved through the creation of a 
national training manual to be used for workshops to enhance awareness on climate 
change. This technical assistance project is particularly important for Swaziland as the 
Kingdom lacks adequate training for public awareness to effectively facilitate the 
development and implementation of climate change adaptation initiatives.  
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III.  4. Barriers to Accessing Finance  
Lower-middle income country status 
Various climate change and development funds made available through the UNFCCC 
are intended to assist the world’s most vulnerable countries with their climate actions. 
Swaziland’s GDP per capita, which is higher than some of Africa’s least developed 
countries, classifies Swaziland as an emerging economy, and thus, a lower-middle 
income country. A challenge with this ranking is that Swaziland’s GDP per capita 
does not reflect the socio-economic realities of 63% of Swazis who live below the 
poverty line (TNC, 2016). 
As a lower-middle income country Swaziland has received funding from the 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), which intends to alleviate the sustainable 
development challenges of countries. Given the HIV/AIDS crisis in Swaziland, a 
significant allocation of ODA funds have been diverted to combatting the epidemic 
that has been crippling to Swaziland’s health and economy (PEPFAR Swaziland, 
2016).  
Swaziland’s ranking as a lower-middle income country, has also overlooked 
Swaziland’s declining economic conditions (PEPFAR Swaziland, 2016). The 
economic strain in Swaziland has hindered the government from filling various 
positions in the country’s key sectors for example; health, education, finance, and 
environmental sectors. This has weakened the government’s potential to deal with and 
to respond to unpredicted situations. The government’s inability to handle volatility 
has been worsened by the 2015-2016 drought, that has forced the Kingdom to allocate 
its already limited funds to urgent drought relief actions (PEPFAR Swaziland, 2016). 
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Corruption on the national level 
A significant barrier hindering Swaziland’s access to finance for climate resilient 
development is corruption. Swaziland established the Anti-Corruption Commission to 
tackle corruption and its negative impacts. The Minister of Finance of Swaziland 
noted that economic losses to corruption amounted to US$ 134.4 million annually, 
which is approximately 3% of Swaziland’s GDP and a total of 14% of government 
revenues (Hope, 2016). Hope (2016), further identifies that losses from corruption 
equated to 1.5 times the national health budget for the fiscal year of 2012-2013 and 
over a half of the Kingdom’s budget for education.  
These losses have required an unanticipated reallocation of funds to deal with 
Swaziland’s urgent development concerns. His Majesty King Mswati III has in 
various platforms expressed a zero corruption tolerance. In a speech at the Opening of 
Parliament in 2006, as quoted by Simelane (2012), King Mswati III stated; 
 
While we might be able to put a lot of effort in fast-tracking our economy, we 
must be alert to the fact that corruption is yet another factor that cripples the 
nation’s development efforts. If left unchecked, corruption will certainly 
destroy our economy and reverse the gains of the past. 
 
Tackling corruption has become a priority for Swaziland as it has the potential 
to weaken governance and institutional structures that are essential for sustainable 
development and poverty alleviation. Corruption also jeopardizes Swaziland’s ability 
to access various funds due to a concern for the appropriate allocation of funds. This 
barrier disrupts the Kingdom’s ability to secure adequate funds for climate action 
from various platforms. 
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Barriers to accessing funding support under the UNFCCC 
Swaziland’s ranking as a lower-middle income country along with its weak 
institutional capacity has been problematic for accessing funds for development and 
climate finance. As of 2014, Swaziland and Somalia were the only two countries of 
49 sub-Saharan African countries that had not secured any climate finance funds. 
South Africa on the other hand has received 25% of all of the approved climate funds 
for the sub-Saharan African region since 2003 (Barnard, Nakhooda, Caravani, and 
Schalatek, 2014). Of all climate finance available to developing countries, 40% of it is 
directed towards mitigation. Although countries like Swaziland would certainly 
benefit from funds for the integration of mitigation to their national development 
strategies, the low adaptive capacity of the country has required adaptation to be a 
higher national priority. A common barrier to finance experienced by Swaziland is the 
weak institutional capacity of the country to prepare competitive proposals in relation 
to other lower-middle income countries.  
As Swaziland has yet to conduct an investigation on the cost of their 
technology needs, the uncertainty of the Kingdom’s specific financial needs causes a 
barrier to accessing funds under the UNFCCC as countries that have put forth funding 
proposals are expected to know their specific financial needs for their various climate 
actions. 
In addition, the climate finance application process requires countries to have 
the institutional capacity to efficiently absorb funds received. Swaziland lacks this 
due to its weak institutional capacity further hindered by a lack of finance and 
technical capacity. Further, access to information and reporting for these projects has 
also proved to be challenging. This is primarily because data collected and reported to 
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meet national Swazi government requirements are different to the reporting 
requirements of the UNFCCC. This has made reporting burdensome for developing 
countries such as Swaziland who already rely on externally funded consultants for the 
national reporting due to a lack of technical expertise on the ground. 
As a lower-middle income country, Swaziland has not been required and thus, 
does not receive support under the UNFCCC to conduct a National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (NAPA) as is required from LDCs. While NAPAs are 
adaptation plans, they have been a useful source of information for identifying the 
exact adaptation needs of countries. Countries that have undergone the NAPA process 
are better geared to complete competitive funding proposals as their NAPA serves a 
holistic depiction of the country’s circumstances and needs. This information is 
important to government, stakeholders, and donors.  
In examining NDC implementation, it is clear that there are barriers that a 
developing country like Swaziland must overcome. The barriers to NDC 
implementation identified in this chapter are also barriers to adaptation. Since 
adaptation is an important priority to Swaziland, addressing the barriers to adaptation 
must be a priority in the NDC implementation pathway as overcoming them presents 
a potential to turn the work of the Paris Agreement into a pathway for empowerment. 
The next chapter will provide a discussion based on the lessons learned and will 
explore the opportunity presented by adaptation reporting and overcoming the NDC 
implementation barriers moving forward.  
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CHAPTER 4    The Road Ahead 
 
 
As the threat of climate change is the primary concern of those living on the 
frontlines, representatives and negotiators of countries that are most exposed to 
climate impacts are working to ensure adequate provisions for adaptation in the 
negotiations. As outlined in chapters 2 and 3, adaptation has and will always be 
important to developing countries, this is especially so for the Africa Group. The Paris 
Agreement establishes a framework that encourages the integration of adaptation 
strategies along with mitigation in the implementation of Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs). While the Paris Agreement indisputably presents a milestone 
for adaptation efforts, it remains an open question how an adaptation pathway should 
be integrated into NDC implementation to best respond to the imminent threats of 
climate change and the adaptive needs of vulnerable groups.  
 In working towards the broad purpose of this MRP, which is to understand 
how adaptation can be balanced with mitigation in the NDC implementation, the aim 
of this chapter is to provide a synthesis discussion in response to the barriers to NDC 
implementation as identified in the previous chapters. I will provide an account of the 
lessons learned regarding the barriers to the implementation of adaptation in the 
NDCs and connect them to the role of reporting as is being discussed from the 
perspective of the Africa Group. This chapter will then outline the opportunities 
presented by adaptation reporting towards fulfilling sustainable development 
priorities. I will conclude by proposing that proactively engaging in overcoming the 
barriers to NDC implementation presents a pathway for empowerment moving 
forward. 
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I.  The Road Ahead 
 
As explored in chapter 2 and 3, the climate governance architecture of the Paris 
Agreement has given adaptation a much-needed platform. Despite this platform, there 
is work to be done to develop a durable and long-term roadmap for the 
implementation of adaptation actions under the Paris Agreement. The push from 
developing countries to move from adaptation planning to implementation (Sharma, 
2016) brings to the fore the question of how exactly adaptation should be integrated 
into NDC implementation. An appreciable concern over adaptation includes, as 
articulated by Lesnikowski et al., (2016) a lack of precision over ‘reference’ points 
from which adaptation progress will be implemented and measured.  
 In response, this MRP has attempted to begin the work needed to understand 
the reference points of how adaptation should be balanced with mitigation in the NDC 
implementation. Before any technical work can begin, there must first be an 
understanding of the needs, priorities and concerns of developing countries. In order 
to appreciate these needs and priorities, there must be a systematic understanding of 
the barriers to the implementation of adaptation in the NDCs. Once this is clarified, 
only then can Parties engage in a response to develop a long-term adaptation pathway 
for NDC implementation. The following section draws on the barriers and lessons 
learned to NDC implementation, which aims to lay the groundwork to identify steps 
forward for a potential adaptation pathway for the Africa Group. 
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II. Lessons Learned on the Barriers to Ambitious Climate Action 
for the Africa Group 
 
The barriers to adaptation implementation in the NDCs as presented below signal 
some of the most pressing needs for assistance for developing countries. This 
investigation has identified political buy-in, finance, technology access, and capacity 
building as the most considerable barriers to NDC implementation. 
 
Entry into force of the Paris Agreement is not enough 
The speed at which the Paris Agreement was ratified is impressive for its illustrative 
global commitment in support for a new climate governance structure. Unfortunately, 
the early entry into force of the Paris Agreement is not enough for developing 
countries who are facing a disproportionate burden of climate change, for whom 
adaptation support falls particularly short. The reality is that under the Paris 
Agreement, much of the details regarding the mechanisms of support and 
accountability for climate action are yet to be detailed (Spash, 2016). These details, 
particularly with regards to capacity building and predictable finance are of utmost 
importance to developing countries, yet there remains little clarity on the details of 
either.  
 
Support for adaptation means of implementation 
As adaptation has lagged behind mitigation over the history of climate governance, so 
has its ability to secure funds for support. This has raised an important question at the 
heart of the climate negotiations about adaptation support. The Adaptation Fund, 
which is intended to support adaptation initiatives, is not near to securing the finance 
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necessary to support or even overcome the barriers to the means of implementation 
explored in earlier chapters of this MRP (Lyster, 2016). For example, by July 2015, 
the Adaptation Fund had approved support for various adaptation projects amounting 
to US$ 316 million, and the fund had only secured US$ 483.3 million at the time 
(UNFCCC Adaptation Fund Board, 2015a). While the Adaptation Fund has been 
making efforts to support Parties, a concern of developing countries is that only 19 
developing countries have actually been accredited for a direct access to financial 
support from the Fund (UNFCCC Adaptation Fund Board, 2015a). While part of this 
is due to weak institutions and a lack of capacity in developing countries, as witnessed 
in the case of Swaziland, the Adaptation Fund is currently responding to the 
adaptation needs of only a small fraction of developing countries.  
While finance admittedly is the most considerable barrier to climate action, it 
is not the only condition necessary for ambitious climate action. Although an in-depth 
exploration of the barriers accessing finance is essential, this work can be pursued 
separately from this MRP. My aim below is to focus on the conditions that need to be 
satisfied along with finance for ambitious climate governance. Along with finance, 
access to the appropriate technologies for the implementation of adaptation initiatives 
is a significant hurdle for developing countries. Chapter 3 highlights that technology 
transfer is not simply about making technologies available to developing countries, it 
is also about ensuring the implementation of effective capacity building strategies to 
facilitate the longevity and national sovereignty in the implementation of climate 
actions. 
Within the framework of the Paris Agreement much emphasis is put on 
technology as a tool to combat climate change (Spash, 2016). Unfortunately for 
developing countries, the current architecture does not enforce binding restrictions on 
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global emissions. Instead, the Paris Agreement encourages GHG reductions and 
emphasizes technological innovation. As Glachant and Dechezleprêtre (2016) 
emphasize, a strong emphasis on technology overshadows the fact that only a few 
emerging markets have benefited from technology transfer under the existing 
Framework; in fact LDCs are yet to benefit given their disconnect to global 
economies. This signifies additional work needed to be done under the Technology 
Framework of the Paris Agreement to ensure widespread access to technology for the 
implementation of adaptation initiatives. In addition, while countries are encouraged 
to participate in technology transfer and to look to technology for low carbon 
solutions, the TEC is itself constrained by a limit in available finance (Glachant and 
Dechezleprêtre, 2016). As a result, in order for a more efficient transfer of 
technologies to assist developing countries to implement adaptation actions, there 
must be greater collaboration between the finance and technology mechanisms of the 
UNFCCC. As noted by Glachant and Dechezleprêtre (2016) these efforts will require 
a close collaboration of these mechanisms to those of capacity building so that Parties 
will be able to better absorb the support received. 
 
Weak enforcement mechanism  
The architecture of the Paris Agreement welcomes bottom-up commitments from 
Parties, making it essential that all Parties deliver on their contributions. Supporters of 
the architecture of the Paris Agreement, including Lesnikowski et al., (2016) believe 
that a core strength of the Paris Agreement is its ‘procedural’ components, such as the 
adaptation communications of Article 7 (UNFCCC, 2015b) which have been 
recognized for their potential to enhance implementation through transparent 
communications and reporting. Others including Spash (2016), Sharma (2016) and 
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Lyster (2017), believe that the Paris Agreement does not adequately ensure 
enforcement, which is necessary for developing countries and the global climate 
effort. Although some Parties identify reporting under the Paris Agreement as 
burdensome, this chapter will emphasize the potential of a robust commitment to 
adaptation reporting for developing countries. 
 The synthesized barriers to NDC implementation above emphasize that the 
adaptation needs of developing countries cannot be addressed without adequate 
support for finance, technology transfer, and capacity building. Although these 
barriers present real challenges that must be overcome by Parties over time, the 
structure of the Paris Agreement should not be overlooked or undermined for its 
significance in bringing to the forefront various support mechanisms to enhance 
adaptation implementation that were not previously in existence. Appreciating the 
difficulty in preventing a situation of backpedaling on commitments as occurred 
under the Kyoto Protocol, there is substance in a carefully crafted and agreed upon 
architecture with flexible yet inclusive features as present under the Paris Agreement. 
One of such structures under the Paris Agreement that presents Parties with a long-
term opportunity is adaptation reporting. Clear and consistent adaptation reporting by 
all Parties, particularly during the implementation of NDCs will be important for 
developing countries in their efforts to overcome the barriers to implementation 
identified in chapters 2 and 3. Clear adaptation communications will allow parties to 
share their best practices, lessons learned, and specific support needs with each other. 
This may in turn assist in the process of working towards overcoming the barriers to 
adaptation implementation, which is necessary in achieving a balance between 
adaptation and mitigation in the NDC implementation. 
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III. Adaptation Reporting: From burden to opportunity  
 
The structure of the Paris Agreement calls for ambitious climate action from all 
Parties. In order to better respond to the needs of developing countries, the Paris 
Agreement establishes various structures to facilitate a process towards the balance of 
adaptation with mitigation. The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) established under 
the Paris Agreement is one of such structures established in response to emphatic calls 
for a GGA from the Africa Group of Negotiators. The GGA’s purpose as noted in 
chapter 2 is to facilitate the process of balancing adaptation with mitigation while 
enhancing the adaptive capacity of Parties and strengthening community resilience. 
The efforts of the GGA are aimed at developing an adaptation pathway that can also 
contribute to sustainable development.  
 To support the GGA, the Paris Agreement establishes the Technical 
Examination Process on Adaptation (TEP-A) (UNFCCC, 2015b, paragraph 124) and 
Adaptation Communications (UNFCCC, 2015b, Article 7(1)). The TEP-A aims to 
identify opportunities for enhancing adaptation pathways by strengthening resilience 
and reducing vulnerabilities. The Adaptation Communications have been established 
so that Parties can report on their adaptation progress made in their NDCs, which is 
important for progressing towards national sustainable development priorities. 
Essentially, in order to make progress on the GGA, it will be important that 
information attained during the TEP-A process that aims to identify pathways for 
adaptation implementation is made public and is accessible. This is possible through 
adaptation reporting and communications.  
 Under the architecture of the Paris Agreement, while the reporting of GHG 
inventories and National Communications are required, reporting on adaptation 
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through adaptation communications is recommended, but not required (Article 13(7)). 
In addition, the vehicle under which adaptation can be reported is flexible (Article 
7(11)), allowing Parties to report on adaptation through already existing reporting 
mechanisms. This flexibility is reflective of the Paris Agreement’s procedural efforts 
to ensure that adaptation communications should not create any additional burden to 
developing countries. 
 For many developing countries, it is important that this flexibility of reporting 
remains so that communications do not become an additional burden. These concerns 
were raised through the submissions made by Parties to the UNFCCC (see Party 
submissions on Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation Communication, 
FCCC/APA/2016/INF.2, October 2016). Parties again expressed concerns for 
adaptation communications during the informal consultations of the Bonn Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) Session; May 2017, which is the 
halfway point between COP 22 and COP23. Some negotiating blocs, including the 
Africa Group of Negotiators expressed their support for the importance of adaptation 
communications, while others emphasized that adaptation communications should not 
be an obligation of developing countries (see submission from Argentina on behalf of 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, October 2016, FCCC/APA/2016/INF.2, p.3).  
 The requests from some Parties to not report on adaptation are the crux of an 
important discussion that has implications for all Parties. On the one hand, developing 
countries request support and the reporting of support provided from developed 
countries. On the other hand, some developing Parties request to not have to engage 
in adaptation reporting themselves so as not to endure additional burdens. This creates 
a question around how the ask for support without reporting obligations will work 
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together, as a lack of reporting on adaptation may hinder the process of overcoming 
the barriers to NDC implementation. 
 In order to better weigh into this discussion, two things must be understood. 
First is linked to the unique procedural features embedded in the architecture of the 
Paris Agreement under which reporting does not have to be a burden. And second, is 
the great potential that adaptation reporting presents to the national level for 
empowerment and in progressing towards sustainable development.  
 First, in the spirit of the Paris Agreement, its architecture is intended to be 
facilitative and non-punitive to ensure that all Parties play their part in the global 
climate effort. In doing so, there is the recognition that some developing countries, 
depending on their circumstances might not have the appropriate institutions in place 
to fulfill reporting requirements. If the architecture of the Paris Agreement embodied 
a top-down, punitive structure such as its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, reporting 
on adaptation would indeed be burdensome. However, in light of the architecture of 
the Paris Agreement, significant progress towards the full implementation of the 
NDCs can only be made if Parties take action in a true spirit of working together. 
Adaptation reporting and communication presents Parties with such an opportunity. 
An anticipated objection may question this outlook as possibly downplaying the 
realities and needs of developing countries. However, such an objection would 
overlook important considerations and features of the Paris Agreement, particularly 
its call for collaboration and inclusivity.  
 Second, adaptation communications have the potential to greatly benefit 
developing countries. Should adaptation reporting be recognized for its potential in 
enhancing the adaptive capacities of developing countries and its contribution to 
sustainable development, Parties may realize that reporting on adaptation is not a 
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burden, but an opportunity instead. Although reporting is voluntary for developing 
countries under the Paris Agreement, in order to ensure a long-term balance of 
adaptation with mitigation in the implementation of NDCs, adaptation reporting is 
essential. A lack of due diligence on the reporting of adaptation may in fact threaten 
the longevity of adaptation contributions. This in turn may hinder developing 
countries from truly safeguarding their adaptation and sustainable development 
priorities.  
 
Opportunities presented through adaptation reporting 
Reporting on adaptation related information, as is encouraged under the adaptation 
communications provides benefits to Parties on the international and national level. 
Internationally, adaptation reporting from individual Parties will be useful towards the 
Global Stocktake, which will allow Parties to identify their collaborated progress 
towards the Paris Agreement. Nationally, proactive adaptation reporting that identifies 
country needs, priorities, and intended actions may assist developing countries in 
identifying the progress made towards their national climate agendas, and their 
broader development goals (Kato and Ellis, 2016). An increase of accessible 
adaptation related information, possible through adaptation reporting might increase 
the likelihood of securing funding from international platforms. An increased 
availability of adaptation information could assist in overcoming some of the barriers 
faced by developing countries such as Swaziland in accessing international climate 
finance as identified in chapter 3.  
 Finally, adaptation reporting will allow countries to identify and better 
understand their lessons learned in the planning, monitoring, and evaluation phase 
throughout the implementation of their NDCs. An understanding of this will be 
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especially important in improving the ongoing implementation of adaptation to 
overcome existing barriers. The benefits associated with adaptation reporting and 
communications have the potential to improve the overall implementation of 
adaptation and encourage ownership over adaptation actions.  
 
Linking adaptation reporting to sustainable development 
As has been discussed above, adaptation reporting presents an opportunity for 
developing countries to improve on their adaptation pathway over time. An improved 
adaptation pathway is an essential component to achieving broader sustainable 
development priorities as signaled in Swaziland’s NDC. Adaptation communications 
would be especially important to national initiatives such as Swaziland’s National 
Development Strategy (2013) and to His Majesty’s Government Programme of 
Action (2013-2018) (Kingdom of Swaziland, Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development). This is because adaptation communications may enhance the overall 
awareness and accountability of national governments in response to their adaptation 
plans as reporting may identify specific adaptation related vulnerabilities that might 
not have been known prior (Kato and Ellis, 2016). In addition, access to this 
information might assist governments to recognize the extent to which their 
adaptation interventions are progressing, or not, towards the overall country and 
sustainable development priorities.  
Kato and Ellis (2016) outline the specific links between adaptation and 
sustainable development, emphasizing the role of an effective adaptation pathway for 
poverty alleviation, food security and water resource management, all which have 
been identified as adaptation concerns for Swaziland in chapter 3. Having greater 
clarity on these issues through adaptation reporting and given the interconnected 
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nature of adaptation to sustainable development, there is credibility in considering 
that the benefits presented by adaptation reporting under the Paris Agreement may 
assist in overcoming some of the barriers to achieving the sustainable development 
priorities of Parties.   
Essentially, the work that must be done to overcome the barriers to 
implementation identified in this MRP, presents an opportunity that can become 
known to Parties through reporting. Developing countries can proactively work 
towards adaptation reporting through assistance received under the UNFCCC. Parties 
and non-member states will need to consider the current reporting communications of 
the Paris Agreement not as burdens but as opportunities- opportunities for 
empowerment, ownership, and sovereignty over national climate actions. A more 
positive outlook for reporting in an adaptation implementation pathway is important, 
as the success of the Paris Agreement is now in the hands of Parties themselves.  
 
The Africa Group leading the way  
The spirit of the Paris Agreement aims to empower and facilitate action so that all 
Parties have an important role in the global climate effort. As has been explored, the 
Paris Agreement created the conditions necessary for Parties to work together 
regardless of individual circumstances. Having provided Parties with the necessary 
procedural frameworks, I reiterate, the success of the Paris Agreement is no longer in 
the hands of the UNFCCC, but in the hands of Parties themselves. A more positive 
outlook, that turns the burden of reporting into an opportunity for a long-term 
adaptation pathway presents a unique opportunity for leadership from the Africa 
Group. In its submission to the APA (October, 2016, FCCC/APA/2016/INF.2, p. 32-
39) the AGN emphasizes the significance of adaptation communications for the 
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Global Stocktake and the global climate effort. As emphasized in chapter 2, the AGN 
is dedicated to be part of the larger climate change solution, and the need for a leader 
for a positive outlook on adaptation reporting presents the AGN with this opportunity. 
As a negotiating bloc representing the views of 54 countries with one unified 
voice, the AGN’s emphatic dedication to adaptation and safeguarding sustainable 
development priorities in the climate negotiations presents the bloc with the potential 
to direct Parties towards a more positive adaptation pathway. In recognizing their role 
as influencers of the adaptation pathway, and pioneers of the Global Goal on 
Adaptation (GGA) the AGN should lead Parties in this more liberated outlook. The 
AGNs dedication to balancing adaptation with mitigation in the implementation of 
NDCs and their emphasis for adaptation that is responsive to the needs of developing 
countries may encourage Parties to purposefully embark on adaptation reporting.  
In thinking ahead, there remains much work to be done by Parties to balance 
adaptation with mitigation in the NDC implementation. During this time, it will be 
important that the AGNs leadership collaborates with existing structures such as the 
Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) of the Paris Agreement that 
aims to assist developing countries to achieve reporting, along with other 
mechanisms. A strong collaboration with the existing structures of the Paris 
Agreement will assist developing countries to adequately engage in the important 
process of adaptation reporting. In addition, collaboration with non-state actors who 
are actively working on understanding the needs of various negotiating blocs may 
present valuable assistance in this process. My goal in this section has not been to 
provide these avenues for collaboration, but to propose that adaptation reporting in the 
NDC implementation should be considered an opportunity for national ownership and 
for empowerment, and not a burden.  
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In making progress on the work necessary to balance adaptation with 
mitigation in the implementation of NDCs it will first be important for developing 
countries to understand the barriers hindering adaptation in their NDC 
implementation. Once there is clarity on these barriers, it will be in the interest of 
developing countries to take the necessary steps to overcome the barriers. In order to 
gain such leverage, adaptation reporting and communications will be fundamental. If 
the flexibility provided for under the Paris Agreement is used by Parties to tailor and 
develop their adaptation communications based on their specific implementation 
needs, there may be potentials realized for national empowerment and towards 
sustainable development. To benefit from these potentials, adaptation reporting must 
be ongoing, Party driven and accessible throughout the NDC implementation phase. 
This chapter has provided a synthesis discussion towards the broad purpose of 
this MRP that is concerned with how to balance adaptation with mitigation in the 
NDC implementation. The chapter provided a brief account of the lessons learned 
throughout the MRP regarding the barriers to NDC implementation from the 
perspective of the Africa Group. After outlining these barriers, I have emphasized the 
importance of understanding these barriers for a better consideration of the needs of 
the Africa Group. The chapter then makes a case for developing countries, under the 
leadership of the AGN to commit to adaptation reporting for its potentials for 
empowerment, progressing on sustainable development goals and balancing 
adaptation with mitigation in the long-term. 
 
To conclude, the purpose of this MRP was to shed light over how to balance 
adaptation with mitigation in the NDC implementation. I have approached this 
question within a governance framework and in relation to the architecture of the 
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Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC. As was stated from the outset, a clear answer 
cannot be found without first having an understanding of the concerns and priorities 
of Parties. This MRP examined these concerns from the perspectives of countries 
representing the Africa Group. By focusing on the Kingdom of Swaziland as an 
illustrative case, the MRP identified specific vulnerabilities to climate change and has 
called attention to the importance of adaptation support for developing countries in 
the implementation of the NDCs.  
Overcoming the barriers to NDC implementation is important, because 
historically, adaptation has lagged behind mitigation. However, as this MRP has 
shown, adaptation has a disproportionate importance for developing countries. An 
understanding of the barriers to implementation with a focus on adaptation has 
identified that there is an opportunity presented to African countries to lead the way in 
proactively overcoming these barriers. Overcoming these barriers presents a potential 
to turn the work of the Paris Agreement into a pathway of empowerment and towards 
sustainable development. While there remains much work to be done on the road 
ahead, this MRP attempts to contribute to this process by clarifying the pathway of 
NDC implementation, particularly for adaptation from a governance perspective to 
provide direction moving forward.  
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